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ABSTRACT
This study was conducted to analyze the methods,
successes, failures, and operational performance of the
German Luftwaffe anti-tank aircraft and units in World
War Two on the Eastern Front, and the possible application
of the Luftwaffe experience to the current NATO air forces.
The research involved interviews with former Luftwaffe
officers who participated in the German Eastern campaign
from 1941-45, a trip to the Bundesarchiv -Militararchiv in
Freiburg, West Germany, a trip to the Air University Library,
Maxwell AFB, Alabama, in addition to participation in an
anti-tank seminar held in Washington, D. C., on 14-15
October 1976.
The results of the study indicate considerable appli-
cability of the Luftwaffe experience in World War Two on
the Eastern Front in anti-tank operations, to the current
military situation in Europe. The USAF A-10 aircraft,
based on the cited historical example, appears to have con-
siderable potential for use as an airborne anti-tank plat-
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NOTES TO THE READER
Throughout the text I have used German military ranks
when referring to German personnel, for example Hauptmann
refers to the German equivalent of a USAF captain, (see
Appendix I for a complete listing of rank equivalents)
.
The German term a.D. refers to ausser Dienst indicating
an officer is on the retired list.
German Luftwaffe units were broken down into the
following echelons: Luftflotte , Fliegerdivision . Geschwa -
der, Gruppe , Staffel , and Schwann . These units roughly
correspond to the USAF: Numbered Air Force, Air Division,
Wing, Squadron, Detachment or Small Squadron, and Flight,
(see Appendix II for a more detailed listing) . The basic
unit for operational purposes was the Geschwader . A
Geschwader was designated in Arabic numerals, e.g. Schlacht -
geschwader 9, abbreviated StG 9 . A Gruppe within a Geschwader
would be designated in Roman numerals, e.g. IV (Pz.)/StG. 9
referred to the IV (anti-tank) Gruppe of Schlachtgeschwader 9 .
A Staffel within a Geschwader (not a Gruppe) would be re-
ferred to in Arabic numerals, e.g. 10 (Pz.)/StG. 2 designated
the tenth anti-tank Staffel of Schlachtgeschwader 2 .
Unit commanders were referred to as Schlachtgeschwader -
kommandore, Gruppenkommandeur , or Staffelkapitan for Geschwader ,
Gruppe , and Staffel respectively. Geschwader were always
prefaced with the type of unit, e.g. Stukageschwader for
a dive bomb Geschwader. Personal rank for officers commanding
at the same level would often vary considerably due to
attrition and the tendency in the Luftwaffe to promote young
and successfully "blooded" combat officers to command posi-
tions, regardless of tenure. It was not uncommon for an
Oberstleutnant . Major , or Hauptmann to command separate
Gruppen within the same Geschwader .
I have retained operational code names in the German
original, e.g. ZITADELLE (Citadel). The English translation
will appear in parenthesis after the first mention of the




As one looks at the relative balance of NATO forces
versus Warsaw Pact forces in Eu ope, a cursory observation
of the order of battle, illustrates what appears to be a
massive communist advantage. The overwhelming numerical
superiority of the Warsaw Pact's conventional forces is
indicated by the following figures:
Disposition of Forces 1975
Divisions* NATO Warsaw Pact + 3 W. USSR Regions
Divisions* 27 58 30
Tanks 6100 19,000 8,000
Tactical Aircraft 1700 2,460 1,290
*See Appendix VII for Soviet Divisional strength
It is of further importance to note that of the Soviet ar-
moured divisions available, 20 are located in the German
Democratic Republic (East Germany) , constituting the heavi-
est concentration of Soviet forces outside the Soviet Union.
The Warsaw Pact's reliance on armour has been increased
dramatically during the last 5 years. The number of tanks
Press and Information Office of the Government of the
Federal Republic of Germany, White Paper 1975/1976: The
Security of the Federal Republic of Germany and the Develop -
ment of the Federal Armed Forces
, p. 33, Federal Minister
of Defence, 1976.
in a Soviet motorized rifle division has increased from 188
2
to 266 during the 1970 to 1975 time frame. The total
number of battle tanks in the Warsaw Pact has also increased
from 13,650 in 1970 to 19,000 in 1975. 3
If one contrasts the present order of battle to the
situation existing on the Russo-German Front in World War
II, several noteworthy similarities appear:
Disposition of Forces 22 June 1941




Aircraft 1,945 5 4,000
Tanks 3,330 22,000 6
Combat troops 3,200,000 4,500,000
*Code name for German Operations Plan for the attack
on the USSR.
+Exclusive of German allies which did not play a
prominent part in the initial offensive.
As one can see, the parallels are more than casually signif-





4Philippi, A. and Heim, F., Per Feldzug Gegen Sowj -
etrussland . 1941-1945, p. 36-7, W. Kohlhammer, 1962.
5Bekker, C., The Luftwaffe War Diaries
, p. 552,
Ballantine, 1969.
6Milsom, J., Russian Tanks 1900-1970
. p. 59, Stackpole,
1971.
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inferiority in personnel and materiel, the Wehrmacht was
still able to mount a successful offensive against the
Soviet Union. A more detailed analysis of the initial
German offensive will reveal that Germany came within a
"hairsbreadth" of knocking the USSR out of the war in the
Summer of 1941. A review of German strategy and tactics
is not the purpose here. The significant point is that a
ratio of forces existed between the Germans and Russians in
1941 which is strikingly similar to the ratio which exists
now between NATO and the Warsaw Pact. The Germans were on
the offensive, and it can be logically assumed that without
the delays and vacillations of the civilian leadership at
that time, the German army could have successfully terminated
the war with Russia based on a continuation of the offensive
from the Smolensk area toward Moscow in early August 1941.
Of course the margin of error was, and still is, critical.
The Germans could not afford the mistakes in strategic mis-
direction in 1941 and still effect a winning campaign. Such
is a lesson of history.
In formulating NATO strategy today, one can draw on the
successful aspects of German operations in World War II. One
of these successful aspects was the use of close-air-support
aircraft in an anti-tank role. In Russia during World War II
the Luftwaffe was able to counter armoured thrusts on the
11
"The Problem"
This Soviet T-34 Tank approached within 20 meters of the
German anti-tank crew before their 37mm anti-tank cannon
was able to penetrate the tank's armour. Photo from
Carell's, Unternehmen Barbarossa.
12
ground, from weapons 1 systems in the air. Consider the
fact that on 8 July 1943, in Karachev, Russia, a Luftwaffe
Gruppe destroyed an entire armoured brigade leaving 50 Soviet
main battle tanks (T-34's) burning on the battlefield, with
no assistance from friendly ground personnel.
As the USAF prepares for the deployment of A-10 close-
air-support aircraft to augment NATO forces, one senses that
a full comprehension of German air-to-ground anti-tank tac-
tics from World War II might possibly prove most useful in
developing NATO air tactics for contemporary Europe. The
relative comparison of forces has already been made; the
parallel does, however, not end there. Studying the actual
conduct of operations on the German Eastern Front in World
War II and the likely situation in which NATO would find
itself given hostilities in Europe, the analogous situation
of a mass army of personnel and material (especially tanks)
being countered by technology and efficiency is apparent.
An overwhelmingly technically oriented military force with
complex modern equipment and aircraft finds itself pitted
against a numerically superior foe with large formations of
simple, rugged, armoured vehicles. A review of the entire
Carell, P., Scorched Earth, the Russian-German War
1943-1944
. p. 76, Little, Brown, 1970.
13
German tactical environment is not appropriate here, how-
ever, a detailed examination of the aircraft/tank battle
will be undertaken. Looking at the Luftwaffe experience
on the Eastern Front in World War II, much material can be
extracted which can be applicable to Europe in the 1980s,
and therefore effect a more efficient use of our aircraft
resources
.
The ultimate course of the war in the East hinged on
many factors other than the confrontation of aircraft against
tank, however, the anti-tank air campaign was in itself tre-
mendously successful and portions thereof can be applied to
the European environment in the 1980s. The critical fact
emerges that with extremely limited resources the Luftwaffe
Schlachtgeschwader* were able to successfully engage armoured
units on the ground. The success of the Schlachtgeschwader
was far in excess of their numbers or relative cost. Oberst
Hans-Ulrich Rudel, for example, personally accounted for
519 8 Soviet tanks with his JU87G Stuka** Admittedly Rudel
was not the norm, however, the implications of one man
^Schlachtgeschwader - close-air-support Geschwader
.
8Bekker, C., The Luftwaffe War Diaries
, p. 438,
Ballantine, 1969.
**Stuka - Sturzkampff lugzeug , or dive bomber aircraft,
used synonymously for the JU87.
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destroying over 500 tanks (enough for 3 Panzer divisions in
1941) from the air is obvious to the position of NATO in
Europe today.
As previously mentioned, the highly qualitative and
technically oriented Wehrmacht of 1943 opposing the massive
Russian formations is, in many respects, strikingly parallel
to the present situation of the NATO forces opposing the
Warsaw Pact forces. On one side an army numerically super-
ior in personnel and equipment, emphasizing manpower and
huge concentrations, attempting to overwhelm an inferior
number of highly trained and qualitatively superior forces.
Each side has certain historical characteristics which
have not changed. For example the Russians relied and still
rely, on railroads as their basic and foremost medium of
logistics support. One can further observe the consistent
Russian tendency to deploy large formations of simple,
rugged and reliable equipment to outfit their ground forces.
The Soviets have also tended to make extensive modifications
to existing weapons' systems, as opposed to opting for com-
pletely new designs. The Russian Armies have always been,
and continue to this day, to be characterized by weak logis-
tics systems, as compared to the resources delegated to
combat formations. To put it more bluntly "the Russian
Steam Roller runs out of steam in a hurry." The choke point
15
of the Russian-Polish border is most important as the rail-
road gage changes and all freight must be unloaded and then
reloaded onto other freight cars.
The West, on the other hand, has placed more emphasis on
the qualitative nature of its armies. The resources are not
available in Europe to outfit mass armies on the Soviet
model. As such, the margin of error for Western armies has
always been much smaller than that of the Russians. The
invading armies of Charles XII, Napoleon I, Kaiser Wilhem II,
and Hitler all shared this common characteristic, so does
NATO.
Nowhere is the disparity in forces more apparent than in
the number of tanks deployed with the Warsaw Pact versus
9those deployed with NATO. Current estimates run from 6100
to 7300 10 for NATO opposing 19,000 for the Warsaw Pact.
The Warsaw Pact figure should be increased to 27,000 if the
three Western Military Districts of the USSR are included.
The Wehrmacht was faced with a similar problem in 1941,
which became progressively worse as the war continued. The
9White Paper 1975/1976 . Op. Cit., p. 33.
The International Institute for Strategic Studies,
Strategic Survey 1975 , p. 63, IISS Publications Department,
1976.
1:LWhite Paper 1975/1976 . Op. Cit., p. 33.
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Wehrmacht had 333012 tanks available in June 1941 for the
invasion of Russia. The Wehrmacht Panzer forces were opposed
13by roughly 22,000 to 24,000 Russian tanks, according to
English soiirces. German sources vary from a figure of
1410,000 deployed facing the Wehrmacht in Western Russia, to
15
a Russian advantage of 4 to 5 times the 3330 German tanks.
Soviet sources vary from a low of 15,000 to a high of
24,000. Taking an average figure of 20,000, a German-
Russian tank ratio would be 1:6. Comparing the German-
Russian tank ratio to the 1:4% NATO -Warsaw Pact ratio, one
can see the need for effective anti-tank weaponry in Europe
today.
A graphic illustration of the similarities between NATO
versus Warsaw Pact and Wehrmacht versus Red Army will aid
in clarifying the parallel in the form of an analogy. The
setting will of course be the same. The weather conditions
can be expected to be the same. The location of the USSR
12
Philippi and Heim, Op. Cit., p. 38.
13Milson, Op. Cit., p. 59.
Philippi and Heim, Op. Cit., p. 39.
15Von Tippelskirch, Geschichte des Zweiten Weltkrieges
.
p. 179, Anthenaum, 1959.
16Milson, Op. Cit., p. 59.
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has not changed and the geography is essentially the same
as it was during the war. (See figure 1 on the following
page.)
The immediate point that would come to even the casual
observer's mind is the fact that the Germans lost the war.
This is indeed the case, however, the Oberkommando der
Wehrmacht ' s (hereafter cited as OKW) plan BARBAROSSA came
shockingly close to defeating the USSR in the late summer
of 1941 and the advent of the worst winter in 2\ centuries
in 1941-42 heavily favored the defending Russians, with the
associated slowing down of mobile forces. One must also
consider the huge territorial resources of the USSR with
over 8.6 million square miles of territory and its huge pop-
ulation advantage (Russia in 1939 200,000,000 versus Germany
with 80,000,000), in light of these figures the near German
victory in 1941 is worthy of more study in of itself.
Fortunately for the Russians, Hitler intervened in the
strategic direction of BARBAROSSA . hesitated and eventually
changed the Schwehrpunkt* from the North/Center with the
objective of Moscow to the South with the industrial and agri-
cultural areas of the Ukraine- -before switching back to Moscow.
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* Internal (Interregional 82.4%)
+Source: Lydolph, P.E. , The Geography of the USSR , p. 552,
Wiley & Sons, 1970.
Figure 1
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The resources situation of the Wehrmacht did not allow
for a margin of error on the order of Hitler's intervention;
as such BARBAROSSA miscarried and the war in the East stale-
mated, then slowly fell in favor of the Russians. It was
during the phase of essentially defensive operations by the
Wehrmacht , that the Germans made extensive use of their
Schlachtgeschwader to combat the ever increasing number of
Soviet tanks.
Again the critical reader would point out that there
are vast differences in weapons' systems acquired with 30
years of technology and progress since World War II. But
are they so different? Comparing the T-34 of World War II
and the T-62 of today, one can observe--from the attacking
aircraft's vantage point— striking similarities:
Comparison of Soviet T-34 & T-62 1 ^
Specifications T-34/85 I & II T-62




Max speed MPH 31 34.4
Eng./type/HP 12cyl/diese!L/500 12cyl/diesel/700
Cooling Water Water
Wheels per side 5 Lg. bogie 5 Lg. bogie
Aux Armament 2 X 7.62MG 1 X 7.62MG
Ammunition main 45 45
Armour
:
Hull rear 45mm 60mm
Hull roof 18-22mm 30mm
18Milson, Op. Cit., p. 172-174,
24
The T-62 is overall much more heavily armoured than the
T-34, however, from the airman's point of view the increase
in armour is essentially irrelevant. Referencing the 2 dia-
grams the reader will observe that the hull roof of the T-34
is from 18-22mm thick, while that of the T-62 is only 30mm
thick. Similarly the hull rear side of the T-34 is 45mm
thick and the T-62 only 60mm. The German armour piercing
19Wolfram (tungsten-carbide) centered 37mm ammunition carried
on the JU87G Stuka with the Flak 18 cannon, had no difficulty
penetrating the above mentioned sections of the T-34 even at
dive angles of 30 degrees and release altitudes of 1000 feet
20
slant range. (See Appendix III) . The A-10 with the 30mm
GAU 8 cannon has demonstrated a similar capability against
a variety of tanks, including the T-62, in conjunction with
weapons' testing at Nellis AFB, Nevada, (USAF Fighter
21Weapons ' Center)
.
As mentioned previously, the Schlachtgeschwader were
more active from 1943-45, than in the early phases of the
war. Victory eluded the Wehrmacht in 1941 and the odds
19Rudel, H.S., Stuka Pilot , p. 76, Washburn & Sons, 1953.
20Karlsruhe Document Collection, K113. 3019-4, frame
1826, unpublished, 1953.
21Aviation Week and Space Technology
, p. 15, 5 January
1976.
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against an eventual German victory declined after the win-
ter Battle of Moscow in 1941. The brief German resurgence
in the summer of 1942 was dimmed by the failure to take
Stalingrad in late 1942 and the eventual German defeat there
in February 1943. The last chance for a German victory
passed with the unsuccessful termination of the ZITADELLE
(Citadel) operation in July 1943. It is generally agreed
that after this point, the best the Germans could hope for
would be a draw with the Russians. Total victory was no
longer a possibility for Germany. This is not intended to
imply that the war was lost- -it only means the war could no
longer be totally won by Germany. Two possibilities, there-
fore, presented themselves: 1) eventual defeat for Germany,
or 2) a war of attrition effecting a draw, with the realiza-
tion by the Soviets that the price of victory would be too
high. At this point (after ZITADELLE) the German margin of
error was not merely critical, it was the key on which the
survival of the Third Reich hinged.
An examination of the order of battle after ZITADELLE
will clarify the point. Army Group South was in a typical
position:
ARMY GROUP SOUTH ORDER OF BATTLE (20-21 August 1943) 2
22Von Manstein, E. , Lost Victories
, p. 457, Henry
Regnery, 1958.
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ARMY GROUP SOUTH ORDER OF BATTLE (20-21 August 1943)
Ger. Army Area of Divisions: Opposed by
Formations Front Formed Strength Russian Formations:
6th Am. 155 mi lOIfy. 3 1/2 31Rf.Div.





lst.Pz.Am. 155 mi 8Ify. 5 1/2 32Rf.Div.






8th Am. 130 mi 12Ify. 5 3/4 44-5Rf.Div.












Army Gp. 610 mi 14Pz. 6Pz.
Key: Pz. -Panzer Rf. -Rifle
Ar. -Armoured TT. -Total Tanks
Ify. -Infantry Co. -Corps
PzG. -Panzer-Grenadier Div. -Division
Cav. -Cavalry Bg. -Brigade
Med. -Mechanized Reg. -Regiment
27
The basic German defensive strategy was articulated by
Generalfeldmarschall von Manstein:
,fWe had to exploit those factors which still repre-
sented a German superiority. Even though, in the
larger view, we were not on the defensive, we had
to try to deal painful blows to the enemy, causing
him considerable casualties, the loss of large
numbers of prisoners, and generally predispose him
to come to terms. We had to make sure that, even
within the framework of a defensive strategy, we
should be able to conduct those flexible operations
which constituted our main strength. "^^
The essential modus operandi was "Tactical defensive, Stra-
tegic offensive."
Hitler's influence over operations was in the end the
single final determining factor in the German defeat in the
East. His constant references to political and economic
consideration taking precedence over purely military opera-
tions, sealed the fate of the Wehrmacht in the East. Von
Manstein' s request for "freedom of movement" to implement
the elastic methods mentioned above, was not comensurate
with Hitler's overall plans. In essence von Manstein 1 s
mobile operations were replaced by the Diktat of "not one
step backward." Hitler replaced von Manstein on 30 March
24
1944 and in his stead appointed Generaloberst (later
23Carell, P., Scorched Earth, the Russian-German War
1943-1944
, Op. Cit., p. 295.
24Von Manstein, Op. Cit., p. 453.
28
Lack of metalled roads caused the Germans a tremendous loss
of mobility during the muddy season.
Photo: Carell, Unternehmen BARBAROSSA
29
The Wehrmacht had 750,000 horses at the start of BARBAROSSA
Mobility was often even a problem for draft animals.
Photo: Carell, Unternehmen BARBAROSSA
30
Generalfeldmarscha 11) Model, a "firm stander," as Commander
of Army Group South (simultaneously renamed Army Group North
Ukraine) . In parting with von Manstein, Hitler said:
"I have decided to part company with you and to
appoint someone else to the Army Group... The time
for operating is over. What I need now is men who
stand firm. "25
As the Wehrmacht assumed its new defensive posture the
Schlachtgeschwader became increasingly active. The command
was initially integrated in the autumn of 1943 when the
position of Waffengeneral der Schlachtflieger* was created.
It consisted of 5 Geschwader comprising 14 Gruppen . equipped
with JU87Gs, FW190s, and HS129s. 26
From the Luftwaffe point of view the formation of the
Schlachtgeschwader command was symptomatic of the Luftwaffe '
s
loss as an independent service.
"As for the Luftwaffe its expanding force of anti-
tank aircraft showed that it was becoming more and
more reduced to the role of a direct auxiliary to
the hardpressed eastern armies. "2'
Late in 1942 the OKW was quite aware of the developing
need for a defensive posture. On 6 June 1942 the OKW





26Bekker, Op. Cit., p. 438.
27 Ibid.
31
Operations Staff prepared a paper with General leutnant
Warlimont's signature detailing the numerous deficiencies
of the Wehrmacht. Notable extracts are as follows:
Army:
Personnel shortage on the Eastern Front on 1 May 1942
625,000 men; the winter losses cannot be entirely
made good.
Armoured divisions in Army Groups Center and North
will have only one tank battalion each (approximately
40-50 tanks)
.
Ammunition difficulties must be reckoned with in
August 1942; they may be insufficient to affect opera-
tions; replacement from stocks of C in C West.
Mobility is considerably affected by shortage of
load-carrying vehicles and horses which cannot be made
good. A measure of demotorization is unavoidable.
At present there are no further reserves available
in Germany.
Navy:
Situation generally favorable (not entirely agreed to
by the C in C Navy)
.
Luftwaffe
From 1 May 1941 figures for aircraft servicable have
fallen to an average of 50-60% of establishment.
The establishment of anti-aircraft artillery has been
raised considerably, but manpower is short.
Recruiting
:
The call up of the 1923 class in April 1941 means that
we are anticipating by 18 months.
Armament
:
During this year oil supply will be one of the weak-
est points of our economy; it may well influence the
operational capabilities of all three Services, the




Serious shortage of raw material for tanks, air-
craft, U-boats, lorries and signal equipment.
Summary:
Our potential is lower than it was in spring
1941. It must be compensated by the infliction of
increased losses on the enemy, superior leadership
and increased efforts on the part of the troops,
quality of weapons and increased emphasis on anti-
tank defense. By these means we can ensure super-
iority at those decisive points where we decide
9ftto concentrate. °
The increased emphasis on anti-tank defense naturally in-
cluded the Schlachtgeschwader . Their first major test came
in July 1943 at the ZITADELLE battles, with notable success,
as mentioned previously.
General der Flieger a.D. Deichmann has written in the
forward of The Luftwaffe War Diaries of an experience shortly
following World War II:
"Soon after the war I was commissioned to investi-
gate the history of the German Luftwaffe on behalf
of a leading western power. One day, while talking
to the high-ranking officer in charge of this in-
vestigation, I asked him why a powerful country like
his, which after all had won the air war against
Germany, showed so much interest in our Luftwaffe .
To my surprise he answered, in effect that they
wanted to find out how, with its 'handful of weapons
and aircraft, 1 it was able to hold out for so long
against the air forces of the world. "29
2°Warlimont, W. , Inside Hitler's Headquarters 1939-45
.
p. 240, Praeger, 1964.
2
^Bekker, Op. Cit., p. x-xi.
Considering the Order of Battle in Europe today, the lessons
of the Schlachtgeschwader and associated anti-tank units





Generaloberst Hans Jeschonnek had the dubious distinc-
tion of being caught up in the personality and command
clashes at the highest levels of the Luftwaffe . Jeschonnek
had been appointed Chef des Generalstabes der Luftwaffe
(Luftwaffe Chief of Staff) in 1939. He was a relatively
junior general at the time and although a brilliant staff
officer, his war time thinking had been somewhat clouded by
an extreme devotion to Hitler. Reichmarschall Goering*, the
Luftwaffe commander, had attempted to use Jeschonnek as a
"scapegoat" for all of his (Goering 's) failures involving
the Luftwaffe , mainly the Stalingrad airlift fiasco. The
Generaloberst committed suicide on 18 August 1943.
"Jeschonnek had fallen between two stools--on one
side Hitler, who believed in his talent; on the
other Goering, whose orders he, as an officer, felt
obliged to carry out however contrary to his own
*Goering's reputation began to slip at Dunkirk when he
promised to destroy the encircled allies with air power
alone--he failed. After that first failure, Goering was
forever attempting to regain his prestige with Hitler through
the vehicle of the Luftwaffe . This made for the unfortunate
case of a major personality in the government having his
personal position, prestige, and credibility tied to the
operational success of one of the armed services. As such
the Luftwaffe was often committed to tasks which it could
not fulfill, e.g. Stalingrad.
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convictions. He had to endure Hitler's rage for
every failure of the Luftwaffe , and Goering's
sarcasm into the bargain ('You always stand in
front of the Fiihrer like a schoolboy--like a little
subaltern with his hands on his trouser seams!').
Jeschonnek was the whipping boy across whose back
the two 'old campaigners' vented their spleen.
But the back was not broad enough- -it broke. "*
The critical post of Goering's Generalstabchef could
not be left vacant. The most capable successor in Goering's
eyes was Generalfeldmarschall Freiherr Dr. Wolfram von
Richthoven.* Von Richthoven was unfortunately not acceptable
to Hitler and the position went to Generaloberst Guenther
2
Korten. Although Korten saw his role as that of Goering's
shadow, unlike the energetic Jeschonnek, he (Korten) did
institute a number of administrative changes in the Luftwaffe
field commands. These changes were instrumental in effect-
ing a clearer division of the tactical and strategic missions
of the Luftwaffe . It was one of these changes that instituted
the Schlachtgeschwader as an independent arm of the Luftwaffe
.
The position of General der Nahkampfflieger (Inspector of
close-air-support units) was created on 5 October 1943.
*Cousin of the famous Manfred of World War I fame.
1Bekker, Op. Cit., p. 454-65.
2Bekker, Op. Cit., p. 466.
3Smith, P., The Stuka at War , p. 100, Arco Publishing,
1971.
4Bateson R. , Profile 211. Junkers JU 87D
. p. 16, Profile
Publications, no date.
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The name was changed to General der Schlachtflieger on
17 October 1943 and the first chief was Oberst Dr. Ernst
Kupfer--a most capable officer. The original arm consisted
of five Schlachtgeschwader comprising fourteen Gruppen which
included JU87s, HS129s, and FW190s, and for a short period,
until their removal as unsafe, a few JU88s. The position
of General der Schlachtflieger was not a command, the func-
tions were limited to inspection and liaison with other
arms, not operations. Individual Schlachtgeschwader came
under the command of the appropriate Luftwaffe field unit.
Oberst Kupfer was killed on 6 November 1943 in the crash
of an HE lll/H-6 while enroute to Salonika, Greece. His
place was taken by Oberst (later Generalmajor) Hubertus
Hitschhold who held the position of General der Schlacht -
flieger until the end of the war.
Within the Schlachtgeschwader the actual anti-tank air-
craft were alloted to one Staffel. The only exception was
the Fourth Gruppe (consisting of 4 Staffeln) of Schlacht -
geschwader Nine, which was equipped solely with HS129s.
The tenth, or special, Panzerstaffel was added one each to
Schlachtgeschwader One, Two, Three and Seventy-seven toward
Luftf lottenkommando 5, Secret Order Number 11613/43
17 October 1943, (See Appendix IV).
Bateson, Op. Cit., p. 16.
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the end of 1943. The Panzerstaffeln were equipped with the
JU87G-1 and JU87G-2 aircraft.* The JU87Gs along with the
above mentioned Fourth Gruppe of Schlachtgeschwader Nine
with the HS129s were the only permanently deployed aircraft
specifically designed for the anti-tank mission. The
original strength of the Fourth Gruppe was sixty-eight
o




but the JU88s were withdrawn as unsafe after a
brief period of operational flying. (See Figure 2).
The main machine used by the Schlachtflieger for anti-
tank operations was the JU87G Stuka. Although the Stuka
had numerous deficiencies, it was simple, rugged and easy
to maintain in the field. Commenting of the Stuka after
the war for the Karlsruhe Project, Generalmajor a.D.
Hitschhold said:
*JU87G-ls were modified JU87D-3s ; JU87G-2s were modi-
fied JU87D-5s; both models carried the Flak 18, 37mm cannon.
Plocher, H. , The German Air Force Versus Russia 1943
.
p. 16-7, Arno, 1967.
8Carell, Op. Cit., p. 76.
9Plocher, Op. Cit., p. 243.
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"The JU87 was already at the beginning of the war
an out dated aircraft. It was too slow and did
not have sufficient defensive capability against
enemy fighters ."*H
This opinion by General Hitschhold is not shared by other
prominent Stuka pilots among them Oberst a.D. Rudel and
12Brigadegeneral a.D. Hozzel. General Hozzel in particular
considered the Stuka to be quite ideal for the Eastern Front,
although not suitable for long range operations as in the
"Battle of Britain." Regular Stuka units did not even re-
quire fighter cover when operating against the Russians.
Russian pilots were, by and large, not held in very high
13
esteem by the Luftwaffe .
There was no question on the part of Germany that anti-
tank operations were the main concern of the Luftwaffe in
and after 1943. In spite of the criticality of the anti-
tank mission the Luftwaffe never developed a reliable air-
craft that could be used for deep interdiction of enemy tank
*"Die JU87 war schon bei Kriegsbeginn nicht mehr also
modernes Flugzeug anzusprechen, war zu langsam undkonnte bei
operativen Einsatzen nicht geniigend Feindjager geschutzt
werden."
nKarlsruhe Document Collection, K113. 3019-4, Frame
1237, unpublished, 1953.
12Interviews ; Oberst a.D. Rudel and Brigadegeneral a.D.
Hozzel, 1976. (See Appendix X and XI.)
13Ibid.
14Plocher, Op. Cit., p. 242.
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forces behind the enemy front lines. Theoretically the
JU87G was used only for operations where enemy tanks had
broken through the front and penetrated German defensive
positions. The HS129 on the other hand, did not have the
reliability of the Stuka and had serious maintenance prob-
lems, especially with the engines. One of Oberst Kupfer's
first actions as General der Schlachtflieger was to demand
a conversion of the JU87 units to the faster FW190. Con-
version of Schlachtgeschwader units to the FW190 progressed
very slowly in 1943 as the mounting volume of Anglo-American
massed bombing attacks on the Reich forced the Luftwaffe
to retain FW190s as fighters in the Reichverteidung (home
defense system) . Early in 1944 production of the FW190
increased to the point where conversion of the Schlacht -
geschwader from the JU87 to the FW190 was resumed at a rate
of 2 Gruppen each six weeks. As a result, only one Gruppe
(III/StG 2) of JU87s was still active as a Schlachtgruppe
for day operations by the end of 1944. Simultaneously
the JU87s were transferred to Nachtschlachtgeschwader (night
close-air-support units)
.
15Interview, Rudel, Op. Cit.
16
Plocher, Op. Cit., p. 243-44.
17Green, W. , The Warplanes of the Third Reich , p. 218,
Doubleday, 1970.
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Although FW190s replaced many JU87s in Schlachtgeschwader
units, the FW190 did not normally operate in the anti-tank
role. The anti-tank mission generally continued to be allo-
cated to the JU87Gs and the HS129s. A FW190F-8/R-3 existed
which was equipped with two 30mm MK 103 cannons; however,
this model was only a prototype and never reached production
status. Some twenty FW190F-3/R-ls with the same MK 103
18
cannons, were delivered in 1943. Various FW190s with
anti-tank rockets were tested, but their operational
employment was insignificant.
The HS129 in general had a less effective career as an
anti-tank aircraft than the JU87G. Although the HS129 was
expressly modified to function as an anti-tank weapons sys-
tem, problems with the Gnome Rhone engines precluded opera-
tional success on a scale large enough to tip the scales in
the German favor on the Eastern Front. The Fourth Gruppe
of Schlachtgeschwader Nine did have the notable distinction
of destroying a Soviet armoured brigade near Byelgorod,
Russia on 8 July 1943. (See Chapter IV). By the war's end
the HS129 had faded out of service, its operational employ-
ment being reduced to a mere two Staffeln by January 1945.
18Green, Op. Cit., p. 208.
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HS129 models (anti-tank) carried an assortment of
cannons: the MK 101 30mm, the MK 103 30 mm, and the PAK 40
75mm cannon. The last of these caused the aircraft to be
19
extremely ponderous and vulnerable, and as such was only
used for attacking isolated tanks that had broken through the
front. Only two dozen HS129s with the PAK 40 were produced. 20
The JU87G Stuka with the twin 37mm Flak 18 cannons was
the most reliable and consistent tank-killer possessed by
the Luftwaffe . The JU87G, or "Gustav ." remained the main
anti-tank aircraft of the Luftwaffe up until the end of the
war in May 1945. As the Schlachtgeschwader converted to
FW190s the JU87Gs were retained as a special anti-tank
Staffeln within Schlachtgeschwader One, Two, Three, and
Seventy-seven, as previously mentioned. The only pure Stuka
21
unit was the Third Gruppe of Schlachtgeschwader Two.
Oberst Rudel made the JU87G famous and his success with the
"Gustav" far exceeded any other Luftwaffe pilot.
19Ibid., p. 397.
20Green, Op. Cit., p. 396.
21Bateson, Op. Cit., p. 17.
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CHAPTER II
Training and Operational History of the Schlachtflieger
At the outbreak of World War II the Luftwaffe had accu-
mulated a highly experienced core of elite pilots. This
core declined markedly as the war progressed, and the level
of experienced personnel in the Luftwaffe continued to de-
cline throughout the war. The basic cause for the lack of
properly trained replacement personnel was the Luftwaffe 's
unpreparedness for a long war.
"There can be no doubt of the fact that the
restrictions placed on Branch 3 (training) origi-
nated in great part with the man who became Chief
of the Luftwaffe General Staff on 1 February 1939.
Hans Jeschonnek, the fourth and easily the most
significant of the Luftwaffe 's General Staff Chiefs,
placed very little value on the development of a
closely-knit training program. His interests lay
in other directions. He was a man of his own day.
His responses to the demands of his time were
appropriate and sure, and he even showed a certain
talent for improvisation when necessary. The estab-
lishment of a systematic program of training, by its
very nature time-consuming and directed to the
future, interested him far less than the employment
of already available forces, in other words, of the
strategic-tactical force in being. This occupied
his interest to the exclusion of almost everything
else." 1
Suchenwirth, R. , Historical Turning Points in the
German Air Force War Effort
, p. 20, Arno Press, 1966.
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Until the latter phases of the war, the Schlachtflieger in
general and the Panzeri&gerstaffeln in particular continued
2
to receive well trained replacement pilots. The shortage
of fuel had a serious enough effect on combat operations,
the fuel shortage was a disaster for Luftwaffe training.
Courses were reduced in flying-hour content and increased
in length. The increase in length was due to flying hour
cutbacks and therefore delays in finishing a course of
training.
Under normal conditions a Schlachtflieger would have a
rather extensive preparatory training prior to reaching his
combat unit. After basic pilot training, the selectee for
Schlachtflieger training would undergo a very extensive
medical examination to insure that he was physically capable
of withstanding the tremendous "G" loads encountered in steep
dive recoveries. The Stuka training program was the most
commonly used one for Schlachtflieger . The selectee would
attend a three month course at a dive bombing school. He
would then attend an additional three months of Erganzung
(supplementary) training with advanced tactics, and exer-
cises including training with other friendly aircraft which
would simulate enemy tactics. After posting to an operational
2
Interview, Brigadegeneral a.D. Hozzel, 1976.
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unit the new Schlachtflieger would be a Kettenhund (wingman)
for 20 or more combat missions, before being considered for
a flight lead position or before being considered operation-
ally ready.
A few pilots were originally co-opted into the Luftwaffe
from the Reichswehr in the early and mid thirties and became
the elite of the younger Luftwaffe commanders. These spec-
ially selected officers were given training in fighters,
weather flying, bombers, dive bombers and advanced tactics
schools. These former Reichswehr officers became the core
of elite within the Luftwaffe and often rose meteorically
3in the Luftwaffe command structure.
Towards the end of the war, however, the elaborate
training mentioned above was drastically reduced and
abbreviated. Pilots often were given only training in the
aircraft that they would fly in combat. The early battles
in Russia in 1941 cost the Luftwaffe dearly in terms of
losses of experienced personnel. The failure to develop a
program for adequately trained replacement pilots, prior to
and early in the war, was a major cause for the deteriora-




A noteworthy feature of the training and subsequent
employment of the Schlachtfliegern was the close identifi-
cation with the German soldier on the ground, whom they
supported from the air. One manifestation of this bond of
comradship was the "Infantry Assault Badge" that was painted
priminently on the noses of Schlachtflieger aircraft.
The normal complement of a Luftwaffe Schlachtflieger -
4gruppe appeared thusly:
1 Commander (a Major or Oberstleutnant , or in rare
cases an exceptionally well qualified Hauptmann)
20 Officer pilots
30 Enlisted pilots
50 Bordfunker/Bordschutzer (backseaters of the Stukas,
not applicable to the HS129s)
Schlachtflieger units were normally echeloned in the
following manner:





12 + 3 =15
3 Staffeln+Stab(5)=50










The actual training of the JU87G anti-tank units appears
to have been conducted on a piecemeal basis at the front.
Oberst Rudel for example, mentions introducing the new JU87G
cannon-carrying Stuka to his unit. The HS129 pilots were,
however, trained by the 11th (Pz) Staffel of Schlachtgeschwader
Nine, which was relocated from the Eastern Front on 27 Dec-
ember 1943 and reformed as a training unit in Germany.
Operational History of Anti-Tank Aircraft
By 1942 the Soviets had made up the tank losses of the
previous year through great increases in tank production and
deliveries from their allies. Smaller tank formations or
tank supported infantry continually sought to breech the
over-extended German front. Soviet tank attacks led to
crisis situations as the Wehrmacht rarely possessed suffi-
cient anti-tank weaponry on the Eastern Front. The employ-
ment of Stukas and close-air-support aircraft with bombs
against single-tank targets proved ineffective. The Luft -
waffe leadership therefore sought to rectify the situation
by arming aircraft with anti-tank cannons.
Rudel, H., Stuka Pilot




. p. 60, Schweiger
6c Pick Verlag, 1971.
8Ibid., p. 57-59.
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The first confrontation of cannon armed aircraft and
Soviet armour came in June 1942 with the HS129 carrying a
MK 101 Bordkanonen . The destruction of 23 Soviet tanks in
the course of the battle of Kharkov in mid-June 1942 demon-
strated the effectiveness of the new weapons system. By
December the four Gruppen of Schlachtgeschwader One and Two
each possessed a Panzerjagerstaffel of HS129s as a special
formation for enemy tank destruction from the air. Addi-
tionally it was directed at the end of 1942 that each
Jagdgeschwader (fighter wing) would have a HS129 Panzerjager -
staffel assigned to it, however, only one was so outfitted;
the Tenth (Pz) Staffel of Jagdgeschwader 51. By the end of
1943 this unit (10 (Pz)/JStG 51) was assigned to the south-
ern sector of the German Eastern Front.
A test command for the employment of anti-tank aircraft
was established by the Luftwaffe at the Rechlin test center
late in 1942. In April 1943, this unit was transferred to
the Eastern Front. The unit consisted of JU87Gs with 37mm
cannon mounted under each wing, JU88s with one centerline
mounted 75mm cannon, MDllOs, and HS129s. The JU88s and
MEllOs were not certified for combat due to technical and
aerodynamic difficulties. The remaining HS129s and JU87Gs
were assigned to support the army on the Kuban bridgehead.
They did so with excellent results, sinking over 100 Russian
49
troop transport craft in the lagoon. Hereafter the employ-
ment of Panzerjagerstaffeln was restricted to hunting and
destruction of enemy tanks. Tactics were developed to solve
the problems associated with attacking the enemy armoured
formations immediately in front of friendly ground troops.
On 17 June 1943, the test unit was disbanded. The air-
craft were assigned to individual Geschwader as Panzerjager -
staffeln . In February 1943, at Chortiza Panzer i agdkommando
Weiss was formed; this unit enjoyed numerous successes in
combating tanks which had broken through the German front
lines , From this unit the command of Fiihrer der Panzerjager -
staffeln was created, and the previously individual Staffeln
were brought together into a single unit where they could
be concentrated at critical points all along the Eastern
Front.
Thus the Panzer j agerstaffeln came into numerous success-
ful operations in the critical phases of the German defensive
and counter attacking battles of 1943 „ During the ZITADELLE
battles the Panzer j agerstaffeln were instrumental in pro-
tecting the exposed flank of the Second SS Panzer Corps and
in keeping the Orel-Karatschew logistics line open.
With the general reorganization of the Schlachtgeschwadern
in November 1943, the HS129s were all combined into the
Fourth ( Panzer) Gruppe of Schlachtgeschwader Nine. The
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remaining JU87Gs were retained as special units within the
individual Schlachtgeschwader until war's end.
In the heavy defensive battles of the last year of the
war, the Panzerjagerstaffeln were coupled with other Schlact -
flieger and employed in the critical areas up to the very
end of the war. The Panzer j'agerstaffeln attempted to counter
the overpowering strength of the Soviet tank formations; and
attempted to extract the highest possible price from the
advancing Russians. The Panzerjagerstaffeln were often
instrumental in allowing German ground forces to escape
capture by Soviet units and withdraw in good order to the
West. On 8 May 1945 the Geschwaderkommodore of Geschwader
Immelmann flew the last Panzeri agers taffel sortie of the
war. He alone had destroyed 519 Soviet tanks from the air.
51
CHAPTER III
Setting, Tactics and Historical Summary
To place the 1943-44 Russo/German military setting, in
its strategic context, a brief review of Russian military
geography in the eyes of the Luftwaffe is in order. To a
German, the most ominous and yet alluring characteristic of
Russia, was its seemingly unlimited size (1941: 8.35(10)
square miles) . The Lebensraum policy would have been mean-
ingless without the vas t, relatively under-populated areas
of the western Soviet Union. Indeed, General a.D. Professor
Karl Haushofer's idea of boundaries was that of "a biologi-
cal battlefield in the life of peoples." 1 Haushofer and
his theories of Lebensraum and Geopolitik were similar to
those of Hitler, and through Rudolph Hess, one of General
Haushofer's more prominent students, there is probably a
more direct connection between Hitler's theories and those
of the scholar general.
The Kolan Peninsula (highest elevation 4068 feet) , Yayla
Mountains in the Crimea (highest elevation 5059 feet) , the
Caucasus (Mount Elbrus 18,472 feet), and the Urals (highest
De Blij , H.J., Systematic Political Geography
, p. 171
Wiley & Sons, 1973.
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elevation 5512 feet) are all exceptions to the usually low
character of the European Russian landmass. Flat and ex-
pansive heights, or more hilly terrain, rise about 650 feet
above the extensive lowlands. The hilly areas comprise the
northwestern Karelian and Kolan Peninsulas. To the east
and south of those areas are the Valdai Hills (highest ele-
vation 1056 feet) and Timanskiy Roge (highest elevation
850 feet) . The above mentioned areas are the major contrast
to the vast bleak, and monotonous Russian landscape. This
landmass is divided by some of the largest rivers in the
world: the Volga, Dnieper, Don, Kama and Severnaya-Dvina
are well over one thousand miles in length. The relatively
higher elevations of the western banks of Russian rivers,
in contrast to their relatively lower eastern banks, tend
to favor forces attacking from west-to-east. The Pripyat
river, an exception to the general north-to-south or south-
to-north flow, runs from west-to-east. The Pripyat, with
its source around the Mazurian Lakes in East Prussia, creates
an almost insurmountable obstacle to movement in any direc-
tion. That river forms the Pripyat Marshes due to its sub-
division into a densely branching system of tributaries.
The largely impassable Pripyat Marshes accounted for the
huge gap between the combat zones of German Army Group
Center and Army Group South.
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The forest zone south of the tundra line afforded
excellent concealment and potential cover for the defending
Russians. Forest, coupled with large area, broad river
systems, and primitive communications all worked to the
advantage of the defenders. The formidable geographic
features were not comparable, however, with the advantage
offered the Russians in the form of potentially severe win-
ter weather. The Germans had the misfortune of attacking
in 1941 which proved to include the worst winter in Europe
2
in two and one-half centuries. Forty degrees of frost
were recorded in the winter of 1941-42, as early as the end
of November and the first days of December. In frustration,
the Luftwaffe units in Russia were forced to use open fire
heaters for warming aircraft engines and coined the expres-
sion "start up or burn up." The Luftwaffe commander of two
Stukagruppen (with a normal establishment of 100 aircraft)
at the battle for Moscow in 1941, could only put three to
six aircraft in the air each day due to combat losses and
maintenance problems associated with the unprecedented cold
4
weather.
2Stolfi, R H.S., Chance in History. The Russian Winter,
of 1941-42
, p. 21.
^Interview, Oberst a.D. Rudel, 1976.
4Interview, Brigadegeneral a.D. Hozzel, 1976.
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BARBAROSSA had sought a favorable military solution in
Russia within six to twelve weeks, yet Germany found itself
in 1943 in the third year of a war with the Soviet Union.
Operation TYPHOON (code name for the operation to capture
Moscow in 1941) had not been successfully concluded, by
early 1943, the 230,000 men of the Sixth Army were either
dead or in Russian captivity after failing to hold Stalingrad,
North Africa had been lost, the summer offensive into the
Caucasus had to be recalled, and ZITADELLE was prematurely
called off as Hitler withdrew the Second SS Panzer Corps to
strengthen Italian forces as a counter to allied landings in
Sicily. By late 1943 the Wehrmacht was faced with a collec-
tion of enemies growing stronger with each passing day,
while Germany could only count on becoming relatively weaker.
The urbane von Manstein was requesting "freedom of movement"
at Army Group Don and Hitler was searching for "firm standers."
The prospects in 1943, after the failings mentioned above,
were none too optimistic for the Wehrmacht . It was into
this setting that the newly formed Luftwaffe anti-tank units
were thrown in the massive German defensive battles, all
along the Eastern Front.
Carell, P., Unternehmen Barbarossa. Per Marsch nach
Russland, p. 549, Ullstein, 1963.
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The anti-tank aircraft were, in effect, extraordinarily
mobile flying anti-tank artillery. By 1943, due to the grossly
disproportionate lower number of German formations facing the
Russian masses, the Wehrmacht could no longer successfully
cover the entire front. The poor road net, shortage of
petrol, and general lack of resources, forced the Wehrmacht
into the use of cannon carrying aircraft as anti-tank weapons
systems. Aircraft possessed the mobility and speed necessary
to concentrate firepower over distances of startegical signif-
icance in the broad expanses of the Ukraine in order to counter
the powerful Soviet armoured thrusts at the German defensive
positions. A Stuka anti-tank formation, for example, could
easily counter an armoured break-through 150 miles from the
Stuka home base and put ordnance on target in less than an
hour from initial notification. The Wehrmacht had spent
itself in the previously mentioned offensive battles and
after ZITADELLE (July 1943) , the Germans were never again
to regain the initiative on the Eastern Front. The Wehrmacht
had been inexorably bled white by Hitler's strategic mis-
calculations*, no longer possessed the resources for major
*Perhaps this criticism of Hitler is a bit harsh. It
has been said by Genera Ifeldmarschall Rommel, amongst others,
that Hitler knew he could no longer win the war after the
defeats at Stalingrad and in North Africa. Hitler was, how-
ever, rebuffed in his attempt at negotiations with the West
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offensive operations, and required imaginative innovations
in anti-tank defense like flying high-velocity, automatic
cannons
.
The Wehrmacht ground situation dictated the methods
employed by the anti-tank Staffeln. The Staffeln became an
extremely effective weapon system available to the badly
outnumbered German ground forces, enabling the Germans to
concentrate anti-tank weaponry rapidly against attacking
Soviet armoured formations. The time required to move a
German division into position from Army Group Don to Army
Group Center to counter an attacking Soviet armoured forma-
tion was often too long and therefore precluded the use of
ground forces. Aircraft, on the other hand, could quickly
bring massed anti-tank firepower to the scene--often in
minutes. Four JU87G Stukas could carry eight 37mm anti-tank
as his regime was not politically acceptable." In effect,
Hitler had two options: handing the hard won reins of power
over to a military junta, which could negotiate with the
western leadership, or remaining at the helm and following
the "strategy of a flamboyant downfall" 7, until the Third
Reich was literally beaten to death. Hitler opted for a
"Wagnerian termination," finis coronat opus
.
Liddell Hart, B.H., The Rommel Papers , p. 428, Harcourt,
Brace & World, 1953.
Fest, J.C., Hitler, p. 693, Harcourt Brace Jovanovich,
Inc., 1973.
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cannons and 48 rounds of ammunition, each capable of knock-
ing out a Soviet tank by perforating the top, rear side or,
rear armour.
The Luftwaffe used four basic cannon designs to equip
its anti-tank aircraft: the Flak 18, MK 101, MK 103, and
PAK 40* whose characteristics are as follows:
Aircraft Number of
Cannon Calibre Platform Rounds
Flak 18 37mm JU87G 12 (6 per gun)
PAK 40 75mm HS129 12
MK 101 30mm HS129 30
MK 103 30mm HS129 30
The Flak 18 was fitted to the JU87G Stuka in the form
of two pod-mounted cannons , one 420 kilogram cannon being
g
attached under each wing outboard of the main landing gear.
Each cannon carried six rounds of 37mm ammunition and the
9+
muzzle velocity was 2159 feet per second. (See Appendix
III for complete penetration capabilities)
.
*PAK - Panzerabwehrkanonen - anti-tank cannon.
8Just, G., Stuka-Oberst Hans Ulrich Rudel
. p. 132,
Motor Buch Verlag, 1975.
Q
^Smith, P., Stuka at War , p. 90, Arco Publishing Company,
1971.
+0berst Rudel's were special 37mm rounds and had a muzzle
velocity of 1100 meters per second.
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The MK 101 and MK 103 cannons were basically similar
except that the MK 103 had a higher muzzle velocity and
flatter trajectory. Both MK 101 and MK 103 armament packs
carried 30 rounds of 30mm ammunition. The 30mm packs were
carried on the HS129 centerline armament station.
the PAK 40 75mm cannon had very little combat service
when mounted on the HS129 aircraft because so few were pro-
duced for use with that airplane. The PAK 40 equipped
HS129s were also so ponderous and vulnerable as to make them
suitable only for employment against isolated tanks that had
broken through the front lines
.
There were several munitions, aside from cannon, that
were used by the Luftwaffe against armoured vehicles. Ini-
tially in the war, the Luftwaffe used large high-explosive
bombs (500 kilogram) and a type of napalm (Flammbomb) . These
weapons were not overly successful against tanks; almost a
direct hit was required to neutralize an armoured vehicle.
Experience showed chances of a hit and subsequent kill were
greatly improved with a large number of smaller bomblettes
(4 kilogram) dropped from one container. This cluster system
was designated as SD-4-H1*, and the hollow charge principle
enabled the bomblettes to penetrate armour up to a thickness
^Abbreviation for Hohlladung - Hollow charge,
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A clip of six 37mm cannon shells.
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':.:-
A close-up of the wing mounted 37mm cannon.
(Wheel covers are removed from this Stuka to










































Servicing the MK 101 30mm cannon on the HS129 aircraft.
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of 128mm. The optimum effectiveness of the SD-4-Hl's was
found to be when carried in a 500 kilogram container carry-
ing 78 SD-4-Hls. These munitions were carried primarily by
the JU87 Stuka. During 1944, the use of bomblettes decreased
as the JU87s were replaced by FW190s which were not designed
to drop the SD-4-Hls. The anti-tank rockets developed in
late 1944 and early 1945, did not reach the Luftwaffe units
in the field in sufficient quantity or time to have any
decisive effect on the outcome of the war.
The specific tactics used in delivering bombs against
armoured targets normally began with an attack from an alti-
tude of approximately one thousand meters and dive angle of
thirty to forty-five degrees. Ordnance was released on the
12
basis of the pilot's sight picture. It was necessary to
hit the tank or come very close (within twelve feet) in
13
order to neutralize it. Anti-tank bomb and napalm attacks
were different from normal Stuka dive attack. A normal
attack would commence at approximately 4000 meters, then
establish a dive angle of 80 to 90 degrees, set air-speed
Deichmann, P., German Air Force Operations in Support
of the Army , p. 48, Arno, 1962.
Ibid.
12Interview, Hozzel, Op. Cit.
13Deichmann, Op. Cit., p. 49.
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of 560 KPH (with speed brakes extended) and then release at
an altitude of between 500 and 700 meters . In extremely
high threat areas the speed brakes would not be used and
the Stuka would pull out at a velocity of 700 KPH.
Attacks against tanks using the airborne cannon were
very individual according to the technique and skill of each
pilot. Rudel, for example, would roll in from approximately
eight hundred meters and attain an attack speed of 320 to
340 KPH (200 to 212 MPH) . He would then make rapid and
random evasive maneuvers (jinking) in a roughly twenty
degree dive angle. The S tuka '
s
internally mounted 7.62 MG
would sometimes be used for tracking prior to firing one
round from each of the wing mounted 37mm cannons. Rudel
would only stop his jinking long enough to aim and fire.
It is important to note that Rudel, at the war's end, had
over 2500 combat sorties and the experiences that he had
gained enabled him to "see" slant ranges and thereby fire
at the appropriate moment and then immediately commence
jinking again to avoid the Soviet Flak batteries. Both
JU87G and HS129 pilots preferred to work at minimal slant
ranges in order to improve accuracy and this type of close-
in tactic naturally called for very aggressive and skilled
^Interview, Rudel, Op. Cit.
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pilots. Aircraft losses during the phase of flight when
the pilot was acquiring his target, prior to firing were
quite high. Naturally a pilot with Rudel's experience
had an advantage in that he was able to judge slant range
almost by instinct and therefore could jink for a longer
period of time prior to firing, and more importantly he did
not require a long time flying in the same flight path while
tracking a target prior to firing.
Later in the war after the Soviets had experience with
the tank-killers, Flak was increased and the attacking anti-
tank aircraft went to a system of FW190s or normal Stukas
flying Flak suppression while the JU87Gs attacked the tanks.
This system proved very effective, especially in Rudel's
case.
16
It is unavoidable that so much attention is given to
Germany's top tank -killer, Oberst Rudel. His personal ex-
ploits and association with the Luftwaffe anti-tank mission
are so impressive as to overshadow any other individual.
The author is cognizant of the fact that Rudel was a most
unusual man and certainly not the norm, then or now. How-
ever, his characteristics can be a most valuable guide to
15,,.,Ibid.
16
Rudel, H., Stuka Pilot
, p. 77-78, Washburn, 1953
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the desired ideal. The German hierarchy was also aware of
this fact. In a conversation between Oberst Kupfer, the
General der Schlachtflieger . and General feldmarschall Milch,
the Reichsminister der Luftfahrt (State Secretary for Avia-
tion) late in 1943, Milch stressed the point that it would
be nice to have more men like Rudel to stick in Luftwaffe
cockpits. In this same conversation a rather sophisticated
appreciation of Waffenstolz* appears. There was concern
that mixed Geschwader with Staffeln of FW190s and JU87s might
jeopardize the Waffenstolz and therefore effectiveness of
the units involved. Milch drew the analogy of a regiment
composed of battalions of Grenadiers and Fusiliers to that
of a Geschwader composed of Schlacht « Stuka and Panzer jager
Gruppen . The anti-tank Staffeln were independent units,
self-sustaining and did not come under the operational con-
trol of Gruppen . Milch was also responsible for changing
the name from Nahkampfflieger to Schlachtflieger „ as it was
thought that Nahkampf had somewhat of an inferior ring to it.
Schlacht , on the other hand, was more aggressive and emphatic
in tone.
*Waffenstolz . a difficult term to translate, essentially
a soldier's pride in his weapons system, but also carrying
the implication of aggressive utilization when such pride is
evident.
17Karsruhe Document Collection, K113. 3019-4, frame 0083,
unpublished, 1953.
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The disposition of ground forces on the Eastern Front
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The projected deployment of A-10 close-air-support
aircraft to Europe to augment NATO's air forces, has the
potential of significantly redressing the massive Warsaw
Pact advantage in armour which presently exists in Europe.
Currently NATO possesses 6100 tanks compared with the
Warsaw Pact's 27,000 (including the 3 Western Military
Regions of the USSR). The A-10 with its 30mm GAU 8 cannon
has comonstrated a consistently superior tank killing capa-
3bility. With reference to the disparity in the figures
above, the need for NATO to develop an aggressive and mobile
anti-tank force is obvious.
Many historical precedents for modern warfare were es-
tablished on the Eastern Front in World War II, as the
German and Russian armies fought one another for nearly 4
years. One of these precedents was the confrontation of
•Wite Paper 1975/1976, The Security of the Federal
Republic and Development of the Federal Armed Forces , p. 33,
Federal Ministry of Defense, 1976.
2Ibid.
Aviation Week and Space Technology
, p. 15, 5 January
1976.
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aircraft versus tank, during the ZITADELLE (Citadel) battles
of July 1943. ZITADELLE was the code name given to the last
great German offensive which was aimed at the Russian salient
around the city of Kursk. It was during this battle that
tactical aircraft scored the first significant victory over
enemy ground armoured forces, without any assistance or con-
tact with friendly ground troops. This encounter proved
the utility of anti-tank aircraft.
German army commanders were not in the habit of heaping
praise on their counterparts in the Luftwaffe . On the
occasions when such praise was forthcoming one can rest
assured that it was well deserved. A case in point is the
teleprint sent by Generaloberst (later Generalfeldmarschall )
Model to the First Fliegerdivision :
"For the first time in the history of the war the
Luftwaffe has contained the danger of strong
armoured formations threatening the rear of two
German armies, without any assistance from friendly
ground fo re e s . ' '*^
This historical achievement was during the final phases of
Operation ZITADELLE when the German units were withdrawing.
*"Erstmalig in der Geschichte des Krieges ist es der
Luftwaffe gelungen, eine ruckwartige Bedrohung von zwei
Armeen durch eine starkere russiche Panzerheit ohne jedes
Mitwirken von ErdkrSften zu beseitigen."
4
Karlsruhe Document Collection, K113. 3019-4, frame 1635,
unpublished, 1953.
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Generaloberst Model was referring to the sealing off of a
Russian break-through on 19 July 1943 which had blocked the
Bryansk Orel railway at Khotinez--thus imperiling the only
reinforcement route for two German armies. On the same day
practically every battle-worthy Gruppe of the eastern Luft -
waffe was packed into the First Fliegerdivision area based
at Karachev, Russia, to counter the Russian break-through.
As a result it was possible to seal off the area and shortly
afterwards clear the Orel salient of Russian troops. "By
its vital contribution at Karachev, from 19-23 July 1943,
the Luftwaffe had in fact prevented a second Stalingrad on
an even more terrible scale." "Prevented a second Stalingrad,"
this indeed was the only consolation for the Luftwaffe and
Wehrmacht as ZITADELLE had failed in its critical objectives
and Generaloberst Model was retreating. The Luftwaffe played
a significant part in the entire ZITADELLE operation, and
a more comprehensive examination of the actual planning and
conduct of operations is necessary to comprehend fully the
Luftwaffe ' s role in the last great German offensive on the
Eastern Front.
The specific contribution of the anti-tank aircraft in
ZITADELLE came on 8 July 1943 (fifth day of the German
5Bekker, C., The Luftwaffe War Diaries , p. 439-40,
Ballantine, 1969.
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offensive) culminating in the destruction of a Soviet armoured
brigade near Byelgorod, Russia, by the Fourth Panzergruppe of
Schlachtgeschwader Nine. After an overview of the entire
ZITADELLE battle, an analysis of the Fourth Panzergruppe '
s
action at Bylgorod will be presented.
In anticipation—or perhaps only wishful thinking- -Hitler
said "The victory of Kursk must have the effect of a beacon
on the world." * Hitler was overly optimistic about the pros-
pects, but considering the magnitude of recent Wehrmacht
successes over the Russians and the return of the initiative
to the German armies, the situation of the Eastern Front did
offer the chance to inflict a serious strategic reverse on
the Russians. The opportunity was squandered at Kursk. The
formidable striking power of some of the proudest and most
battle-tested German combat formations was lost along with
the initiative on the Eastern Front.
The actual developments leading up to ZITADELLE began
with General feldmarschall von Manstein's masterly counter
stroke at Kharkov, Russia, in March 1943, which climaxed
his winter campaign of 1942-43. Von Manstein, as commander
*"Der Sieg von Kursk muss fur die Welt wie ein Faral
wirken.
"
Philippi, A., and Heim, F., Per Feldzug Gegen Sowjet
russland
. 1094-1945, p. 211, W. Kohlhammer, 1962.
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of Army Group Don, broke down the four phases of his winter
campaign as follows:
"The first was the struggle for the relief of the
Sixth Army, on which Army Group staked everything
it could possibly afford.
The second phase was the Army Group's struggle to
keep the rear of Army Group "A" free while it was
being disengaged from the Caucasus front.
The third phase consisted of the actual battle to
keep open the lines of communications of the German
armies' Southern wing and to prevent it from being
tied off.
This led to the final, fourth phase, in which the
Army Group succeeded— if on a smaller scale than it
would have liked- -in delivering the counterblow
culminating in the Battle of Kharkov."
The first phase of relieving Generaloberst (later
Generalfeldmarschall ) Paulus's Sixth Army at Stalingrad was
abandoned after all hope of linking up Generaloberst Hoth's
Fourth Panzer Army vanished. To avoid a disaster of greater
magnitude than Stalingrad, von Manstein had to cover the rear
of Generalfeldmarschall von Kleist's Army Group "A" during
its withdrawal from the Caucasus. This second phase of von
Manstein' s 1942-43 winter campaign has not been given the
credit it is due. Had the Russians succeeded in cutting
off Army Group "A," the war on the Eastern Front would have
been shortened considerably. The final (fourth) phase of
von Manstein' s campaign can be described only as the work
Von Manstein, E., Lost Victories
, p. 375, Henry Regnery,
1958.
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of a most gifted solider and strategist. Commenting on
von Manstein's winter campaign, the English military histor-
ian Liddell Hart wrote:
"Following Paulus ' s surrender, a widespread
collapse developed on the Germans' southern front
under pressure of advancing Russian armies, but
Manstein saved the situation by a brilliant flank
counterstroke which recaptured Kharkov and rolled
back the Russians in confusion. That counterstroke
was the most brilliant operational performance of
Manstein's career, and one of the most masterly
in the whole course of military history. His
detailed account of the operation is likely to be
studied, for its instructional value, so long as
military studies continue.""
Kharkov fell to the Second SS Panzer Corps, subordinated
to von Manstein's Army Group Don on 14 March 1943. The in-
itiative on the Eastern Front then passed back into German
hands. Von Kluge (commander of Army Group Center) and von
Manstein opted for starting ZITADELLE with an attack early
in May. Hitler, however, decided against the advice of his
two Army Group Commanders, who were ultimately responsible
for the operation. Hitler wanted to wait for deliveries to
the front of new tanks (Tigers and Panthers )* and other
equipment prior to commencing hostilities. Von Manstein
*The Panther weighing about 40 tons , armed with a 75mm
gun, appeared in 1942. The Tiger was in the 60-ton weight




and von Kluge were not voting. ZITADELLE was delayed until
July 1943.
The basic idea in ZITADELLE was to strike the Russians
a blow of limited scope before they had time to recover from
losses in the winter campaign. A suitable target presented
itself at the Soviet salient which protruded into the German
lines around the city of Kursk (see map page 76) . For this
operation all available armour was to be concentrated in two
great pincers. "The objective of the attack was to encircle
the enemy forces in the Kursk area by means of a well coord-
inated and rapid threat of two attacking armies from the
areas of Bylgorod and south of Orel and to annihiliate them
9
with concentric attack. Generaloberst Model with his
Ninth Army was to attack from the north and Generaloberst
Hoth with the Fourth Panzer Army was to attack from the
south. The initial assault delegated eight Panzer divisions
to Hoth and five to Model. Several infantry divisions
were to join the attack and therefore neighboring fronts
had to be thinned out in order to provide sufficient forces
for the offensive. Lagging equipment deliveries, conflicting
9Carell, P., Scorched Earth, the Russian-German War
1943-1944
. p. 22, Little, Brown, 1970.
10Von Mellenthin, F.W., Panzer Battles
, p. 215,
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opinions at headquarters, and Hitler's vacillations post-
poned the offensive until 4 July 1943. The final disposition
of forces allotted to Hoth in the south consisted of ten
Panzer divisions, one Panzergrenadier division and seven
infantry divisions. The northern thrust delivered by Model
consisted of seven Panzer , two Panzergrenadier « and nine
infantry divisions. Von Kluge, von Manstein and Guderian
(Inspector of armoured forces) all urged Hitler at this
time (early July) to abandon the offensive as it was obvious
the Russians were aware of German preparations* and the
attack would not in their professional military opinion
succeed.
"Befehl ist Befehl .""1" After Hitler's decision, the two
army group commanders proceeded with all possible energy in
an attempt to make ZITADELLE a success. In the lull following
the third battle of Kharkov, German units were withdrawn from
*In his book Scorched Earth , Paul Carell states that the
German plan ZITADELLE was known in detail to the Soviets
through their agent "Werther" who worked at OKW . Carell makes
a strong case. There appears to be little doubt that top
secret operational OKW orders reached the USSR via an opera-
tive in the pay of the Swiss General Staff. Considering the
unusually well prepared defensive positions around Kursk, it
is safe to assume the Russians were well informed on German
intentions
.





the front and given extensive training the the latest tac-
tics. Combat formations were outfitted to full strength--
a luxury seldom experienced by the Germans on the Eastern
Front in 1943. No single previous battle on the Eastern
Front had had such a concentration of German men and equip-
ment. The combined striking force had a total of 3000 tanks
and self-propelled guns in addition to 1800 tactical
aircraft.
The elite of the Waffen SS* units were poised for the
offensive. General der Waffen SS Paul Hausser's Second SS
Panzer Corps included three Panzer divisions: the Liebstandart




(Death's Head), and das Reich . The Forty-eighth Panzer Corps
commanded by General der Panzergruppe von Knobelsdorf f , in-
cluded the Third and Eleventh Panzer Divisions plus the Gross
Deutschland Panzergrenadier Division. The Gross Deutschland
was a very strong division with a special organization. It
contained 80 tanks in a Panther detachment, one Panzer
regiment, two motorized infantry regiments --one a grenadier
^Waffen SS - Weapons SS - combat formations of the SS
serving under Wehrmacht command, not to be confused with
the regular SS non-combat units.
The Gross Deutschland possessed a total of 180 tanks
for the ZITADELLE battles.
12Carell, Op. Cit., p. 24.
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13
regiment*-- and one a rifle regiment. These two strongly
augmented corps made up the main striking forces of General -
oberst Hoth's Fourth Panzer Army.
In the north, Generaloberst Model commanded the Ninth
14
and Second Armies in a personal union, although the actual
striking force for the offensive consisted only of the
Ninth Army. Model enjoyed a rare position as a senior
Wehrmacht general of being well thought of, and more impor-
tantly, trusted by Hitler. It was primarily Model who had
persuaded Hitler to postpone the offensive until July. The
General's aerial photos detailing the Russian defensive
positions convinced the Fuhrer that it was necessary to
have as many of the new Panther and Tiger tanks for ZITADELLE
as possible, thus injecting a fresh tactical approach to the
Eastern Front. The Panthers --as with most new weapons '
s
systems--still had many "teething pains." "The track sus-
pension and drive were not right and the optics were also
*There was little difference in the establishment of
these units. The Panzergrenadiers had a somewhat higher
proportion of heavy weapons
.
13Von Mel lenthin, Op. Cit.
,
p. 218.
14Von Tippelskirch, Geschichte des Zweiten Weltkrieges „
p. 331, Anthenaum, 1959.
Guderian, H. , Panzer Leader , p. 306, Dutton, 1952.
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not satisfactory." In spite of Generaloberst Guderian's
protests the Panthers were sent to the front for use in
ZITADELLE . According to Guderian, it was the new Chef der
OKH, Generalobers
t
Zeitzler who persuaded Hitler to continue
with the Kursk offensive.
The actual conduct of operations by the Germans was
tactically successful considering the Russians lost four
18
times what the Germans did in terms of casualties. How-
ever, the Russians could afford the losses, the Germans
could not. ZITADELLE marked the end for any possible German
victory on the Eastern Front.
In the north Model's forces quickly became bogged down
in the extensive Russian defensive positions, advancing only
19
nine miles in two days. After regrouping, a second attack
deepened the penetration a few more miles, however, the
start of the Russian counter stroke at the German Orel
salient to the north and northeast on 11 July 1943, precluded
any further German advance from the northern wing of ZITADELLE








was forced to divert forces from the ZITADELLE operation,
thus bringing all German offensive action on the northern
pincer to a premature end.
Operations at the German southern pincer developed more
favorably. By 11 July the armoured forces had broken through
the last defensive positions and into the area of Prokhorovka
90
and Oboyon. Oberstleutnant Kark Ullrich with the Third
Battalion, Sixth SS Panzergrenadier Regiment of Division
Totenkopf
,
personally led his men forward and late on the
evening of 10 July stormed the village of Krasnyy Oktybr and
formed a bridgehead across the river Psel. Simultaneously
on the right of Totenkopf , Divisions L.A.H . and das Reich
advanced toward Prokhorovka (see map page 76) . To the
south of Hoth's Fourth Panzer Army, General der Panzertruppe
Kempf with Army Detachment Kempf* was to intercept Soviet
forces attempting to relieve the hard-pressed Russians en-
gaged by Hoth. The situation rapidly developed around the
village of Prokhorovka where a decision was forced.
On the Soviet side, the commander of the Soviet Fifth
Guards Army, Lieutenant General (later Marshall) Rotmistrov
*It was common practice in the Wehrmacht for special
formations to be designated by the commander's name, e.g,
Army Detachment Kempf.
20Von Manstein, Op. Cit., p. 448.
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was Generaloberst Hoth's counterpart. Rotmistrov saw
Prokhorovka inexorably loom as the critical axis of the
21
entire Kursk battle. To counter Hoth's 600 tanks,
22Rotmistrov had amassed approximately 850. In all there
were some 1500 Russian and German tanks and assault guns
committed to the battle at Prokhorovka which began on
12 July 1943.
The actual battle developed into a gargantuan mass of
intertwined armour of both sides, in such close confines as
to preclude maneuver in the classic style of German Panzer
operations
.
The German author Paul Carell quotes Rotmistrov:
"The tanks were moving across the steppe in small
packs, under cover of patches of woodland and hedges.
The bursts of gunfire merged into one continuous,
mighty roar. The Soviet tanks thrust into the German
advanced formations at full speed and penetrated the
German tank screen. The T-34s were knocking out Tigers
at extremely close range, since their powerful guns
and massive armour (the German Tigers') no longer
gave them an advantage in close combat. The tanks of
both sides were in closest possible contact. There
was neither time nor room to disengage from the
enemy and reform in battle order, or operate in for-
mation. The shells fired at extremely close range
pierced not only the side armour but also the frontal
armour of the fighting vehicles. At such range there
was no protection in armour and the length of the gun





Caidin, M. , The Tigers are Burning
, p. 216, Hawthorn,
1974.
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tank was hit, its ammunition and fuel blew up, and
torn-off turrets were flung through the air over
dozens of yards. At the same time over the battle-
field furious aerial combats developed. Soviet as
well as German airmen tried to help their ground
forces to win the battle. The bombers, ground-
support aircraft, and fighters seemed to be per-
manently suspended in the sky over Prokhorovka."^-*
To support the heavily engaged units of Hoth's Fourth
Panzer Army, Generalmajor Walter von Hunersdorff , the
commander of the Sixth Panzer Division was ordered to attack
the Soviet defensive zone between the Donets river and the
town of Korocha. Von Hunersdorff succeeded and a bridge-
head was established across the Donets at the village of
Rzhavets. Tanks from the Sixth, Seventh, and Nineteenth
Panzer Divisions poured across the river and headed north-
ward to the battlefield at Prokhorovka. Generalmajor von
Hunersdorff had in fact moved so swiftly across the Donets
that he and his divisional staff were the targets of a
bombing attack by the Luftwaffe , which had not been informed
that units of the Sixth Panzer Division were positioned on
the northern bank of the Donets. Von Hunersdorff was wounded
in the bombing attack, but the young general elected to stay
with his unit at this critical stage of ZITADELLE .* The
*0n 14 July 1943 Generalmajor von Hunersdorff was hit in
the head by a sniper's bullet, he died three days later from
brain damage while being attended by his wife, a nurse with





climax to the battle was approaching on 13 July 1943, with
von Hiinersdorff ' s successful operation. The path was open
for German armoured formations from Army Detachment Kempf to
move unobstructed northward to Prokhorovka.
It was at this critical juncture, on 13 July 1943, that
Hitler summoned the commanders of Army Group Center and
South (von Kluge and von Mans te in) to the Wolfschanze* at
Rastenburg in East Prussia.
"Hitler informed Manstein at Kluge of what, in broad
outline, they were already aware. On 10 July 1943,
British, American, and Canadian troops had landed
in Sicily from North Africa. Italian resistance on
the island had rapidly collapsed. The 300,000 men,
with the exception of a few units, had simply run
away. The Allies were advancing along the coastal
roads. The only resistance they were encountering
was from German paratroops, Panzergrenadiers , and
anti-tank combat groups.
Hitler did not mince words when speaking of his
Italian allies. He was not only angry, but anxious
to the point of panic about the future development
of the situation in southern Europe.
'Considering the lousy way the Italians are waging
the war, the loss of Sicily is as good as certain.
For all I know, Eisenhower may land on the Italian
mainland or in the Balkans tomorrow. This would be
a direct threat to our whole southern flank in Europe.
That's what I've got to prevent. And that's why I
need divisions for Italy and the Balkans. Now that
I've moved First Panzer Division from France to the
Peloponnese I've nowhere else to draw on, and that's
why they have to be pulled out of Kursk front. I'm
therefore obliged to suspend ZITADELLE . "* 24





Generalfeldmarschall von Kluge reported that Ninth Army
was making no headway and he was having to use all of his
mobile reserves to counter Soviet attacks into the German
Orel salient to the north of Kursk. Von Manstein, on the
other hand, retorted:
"Speaking for my own Army Group, I pointed out that
the battle was not at its culminating point, and that
to break it off at this moment would be tantamount to
throwing a victory away. On no account should we let
go of the enemy until the mobile reserves he had
committed were completely beaten. "^
Hitler remained firm. ZITADELLE was terminated. The last
great German offensive operation of the Eastern Front came
to an inconclusive end--in the words of von Manstein in a
fiasco. ZITADELLE became one more case of German tactical
brilliance being defeated by German strategic misdirection,
building a stronger case for von Manstein' s book Verlorene
Siege ( Lost Victories )
.
To backtrack in time from 13 July 1943 to 8 July 1943,
an important phase of ZITADELLE must be examined in more
detail, in light of the Luftwaffe's anti-tank successes.
The Soviet Second Guards Army had been placed between Hoth's
Fourth Panzer Army and Army Detachment Kempf to prevent a
joining of the two German forces. However, the situation
25Von Manstein, Op. Cit., p. 449.
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was developing at such a fast pace to the north, that the
Soviets had to do something immediately to relieve the
pressure being brought to bear by Hausser's Second SS Panzer
Corps
.
An armoured brigade was formed and dispatched to strike
at the right rear flank of the SS Panzer Corps. The hastily
assembled brigade consisted of 60 T-34 medium tanks and
several rifle battalions. The Soviet brigade was marched
off in perfect formation on the morning of 8 July 1943. The
operation would probably have done considerable damage to
Hausser and, more importantly, upset the timetable for
ZITADELLE, had the Luftwaffe not saved the day by using the
HS129s of the Fourth Gruppe of Schlactgeschwader Nine to
destroy the Soviet formation.
From the Luftwaffe point of view, the HS129-2/R-2 was
the aircraft of the hour. These HS129s were solely respon-
sible for knocking out the tanks of the Soviet armoured
brigade near Byelgorod. The HS129 heretofore had not had
a very noteworthy career. The original requirements for a
close-air-support aircraft were laid out in 1937 by the
Luftwaffe Technischeamt (Technical office) . These require-





armoured aircraft, with two low-powered engines, 75mm armour-
glass glazing for the cockpit, armour protection for both
engines and crew, and a fixed forward firing armament of at
27least two 20mm cannons plus machine guns. Additionally,
the specifications called for an aircraft that did not have
excessively high speed, so that the pilot would have added
28
accuracy when delivering ordnance on enemy positions.
The HS129 prototypes were equipped with two Argus AS 410A-1
12 cylinder inverted-Vee air-cooled engines, each rated at
465 HP for take-off and 415 HP at 7,865 feet. From the
beginning of the test program it became apparent that the
aircraft was seriously underpowered, even without weapons
uploaded. The prototype was sluggish in the air, had poor
acceleration and marginal maneuverability. The Luftwaffe
categorically refused to accept the proposed production model
of the HS129.
After the defeat of France in June 1940, the Henschel
factory gained access to the French firm of Gnome-Rhone
which produced an engine suitable for mounting in the HS129
airframe. The Gnome-Rhone 14M/5 engine was rated at 700 HP
27Green, W. , The Warplanes of the Third Reich , p. 390,
Doubleday, 1970.
28Feist, U. and Dario, M. , Luftwaffe in Action , p. 8,
Squadron/Signal, 1972.
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for take-off and 660 HP at 13,200 feet. Mating two of these
engines to the HS129 markedly improved the performance of
the aircraft.
With the decision in mid 1941 to expand the number of
Schlachtflugzeuge (close-air-support aircraft) after the
successful employment of the dated HS123 biplane, the HS129
29
program was suddenly given top priority. Priority was so
high in fact that even preproduction HS129B-0s were used to
partially outfit the Fourth Staffel of Schlachtgeschwader
One in January of 1942. The lack of sufficient testing and
the urgency placed on forming the new units caused some
serious problems with the Gnome -Rhone engines to be over-
looked. The engine had a tendency to sieze without notice
and it proved incapable of absorbing even the slightest
battle damage. The engines were also extremely sensitive
to dust and sand and therefore could only be operated from
grass or paved surface airfields. A full five months were
to pass before another Staffel was outfitted with HS129s.
By July of 1943 four HS129 Staffeln were operationally
30
ready and serving in combat on the Eastern Front. All
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Panzerjagerstaffeln (Commander of anti-tank squadrons)
.
These four Staffeln of HS129s comprised the Fourth Gruppe
of Schlachtgeschwader Nine. The Fourth Gruppe then con-
sisted of four Staffeln with 16 HS129s each plus a Stab
(staff) flight with 4 aircraft, making a total of 68 HS129s.
The Fourth Gruppe was based as a unit near Mikoyanovka,
Russia (just north of Kharkov) . This Gruppe was the airborne
anti-tank unit which, through its air attacks on 8 July 1943,
removed a Soviet armoured brigade from the Russian order of
battle.
The Fourth Gruppe was reorganized shortly after ZITADELLE
(18 October 1943). Its new establishment was:
FOURTH GRUPPE OF SCHLACHTGESCHWADER NINE
Stab IV(Pz)/StG 9
10th Staffel (Pz)/StG 9
11th Staffel (Pz)/StG 9
12th Staffel (Pz)/StG 9
13th Staffel (Pz)/StG 9
14th Staffel (Pz)/StG 9
(11th (Pz)/StG 9 was withdrawn from combat on
27 December 1943 and reformed as a test Staffel
in Germany)
.
The primary anti-tank weapon carried by the HS129s of
the Fourth Gruppe was the Bordkanonen MK 101. The MK 101
cannon was carried on the centerline station of the HS129

















and could be removed easily if required. The removal was in
fact a common practice, especially in late 1942 when there
were few armoured targets and the HS129s were concentrated
on close-air-support missions. The addition of the MK 101
weapons pack seriously disrupted the aerodynamics of the
HS129; so much so that the maximum speed with the MK 101
cannon pack was only 199 MPH. 31 The HS129 could carry 30
rounds of 30mm Wolfram ammunition.
32Basic specifications for the HS129B-2 are as follows:
TYPE
Single-seat close-air-support and anti-tank aircraft.
POWER PLANTS
Two Gnome-Rhone 14M 4/5 14 cylinder radial air-cooled
engines each rated at 700 HP for take-off and 660 HP
at 13,200 feet altitude.
ARMAMENT
(standard) Two 7.9mm machine guns with 500 r.p.g.
and two 20mm MG 151 cannon with 125 r.p.g. plus one
30mm MK 101 cannon with 30 rounds.
(variation) One 550 pound SC 250 bomb beneath the
fuselage, and two 110 pound SC 50 bombs, or 48 4.4
pound SD 2 bombs beneath the wings.
(variation) Four 7.9mm MG machine guns with 250 r.p.g.
four 110 pound SC 50 bombs, 96 4.4 pound SD 2 anti-
personnel bombs.
(variation) HS129B-2Wa, standard built-in gun arma-
ments and one 30mm MK 103 cannon or two 20mm MG 151







Maximum speed 253 MPH at 12,570 feet; (with 30mm
MK103 cannon 199 MPH at 9,845 feet); range 428 miles
(with 30mm cannon 348 miles) ; cruising speed 196 MPH
at 9,845 feet; initial climb rate 1,595 feet per




Empty 8,400 pounds, empty equipped 8,860 pounds,
empty equipped with external 30mm cannon 9,243
pounds; maximum loaded 11,574 pounds.
DIMENSIONS
Span 46 feet 7 inches; length 31 feet 11 3/4 inches;
height 10 feet 8 inches; wing area 312 square feet.
The Fourth Gruppe with its HS129s had only recently
been organized as an integral unit on the Eastern Front.
Due to previous technical and mechanical difficulties the
HS129s did not enjoy a reputation for reliability. They
were, however, figured into the battle plan of ZITADELLE
and one can speculate in light of subsequent performance,
that their commander had created a "can do" atmosphere of
considerable proportions. As the 8th of July 1943 dawned,
the battle had not yet reached its climax, but as the reader
will shortly see, the Second SS Panzer Corps was courting
disaster.
A pictorial view of the Fourth Gruppe ' s operations
against the Soviet armoured brigade is presented in Figure
3. As previously mentioned, and as is obvious from the
accompanying figure, the Second SS Panzer Corps was in very
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Figure 3
Operation of the Fourth Gruppe of Schlachtgeschwader Nine
8 July 1943
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difficulties as the Soviet armoured force was approaching.
General der Waffen SS Hauser would have had all the makings
of catastrophe, had the Russian forces succeeded in effect-




of Fourth Grup_p_e, Schlachtgeschwader
Nine, Haputmann Bruno Meyer, was leading a Rotta (3 aircraft)
of HS129s on a reconnaissance mission over the wooded area
of Gotishchevo, Russia in the early morning of 8 July 1943.
As a Gruppenkommandeur and therefore participant at VII
Fliegerkorps headquarters conferences , Meyer was privy to
the disposition of all German ground forces in the area.
Hauptmann Meyer spotted the Soviet brigade and instantly
realized the threat to the Second SS Panzer Corps.
Meyer alerted the other Staffeln of his Gruppe , via
radio, to prepare for battle. This was to be the first con-
frontation in history of an armoured force on the ground
being attacked from the air alone, with no coordination or
support from friendly ground units . Gruppenkommandeur Meyer
also alerted Major Druschel's FW190 Schlachtgruppe which was
to assist in attacking the accompanying Russian infantry
and Flak with high-fragmentation bombs.
In order to keep constant pressure on the enemy and
avoid a premature disengagement on behalf of the Soviets,
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Meyer formed his Gruppe into four flying Staffeln of nine
aircraft each. As the one Staffel was returning to the air-
field after expending its ordnance on the Russians, the
second Staffel was engaged with the enemy, the third was
enroute to the battle, and finally the fourth was refueling
and arming on the ground. Simultaneously FW190s would follow
similar procedures, but in lieu of tanks the FW190s would
concentrate on attacking associated personnel and Flak
emplacements
.
The HS129 pilots' tactics would be to attack from very
low level and fire their 30mm cannon at the side, rear, and
engine decking of the Russian tanks. The penetration capa-
bility of the MK 101 30mm round, with the tungsten-carbide
33
core, was 80mm of armour which was sufficient to knock out
a T-34 from the rear hull (45mm of armour) or hull roof (18-
22mm of armour) . It was only possible for the HS129s to use
these low level tactics, and fire at minimum slant range
because the FW190s coordinated to suppress the ground fire
from anti-aircraft guns and from infantry small arms and
automatic weapons.
"It was a battle of machines. The Russian tanks
were unable to cope with this unaccustomed attacker.






with one another, and fell an easy prey to Meyer's
flying tank busters."-^
The Russian armoured brigade was destroyed by the quick
and decisive interdiction of the anti-tank Fourth Gruppe .
The entire operation was over in one hour. The elements of
success on the German side were mainly due to the authority
and competence possessed by lower echelon Luftwaffe field
commanders, as well as the skill and aggressivity of the
individual pilots. Bruno Meyer, only a Haup tmann at the
time, used his initiative and aggressively employed his
forces to counter a massed enemy concentration of armour.
Hauptmann Meyer did not request authority from a distant
command center, he realized the critical position of the
Second SS Panzer Corps and he took immediate action to re-
dress the critical situation facing his comrades on the
ground. Meyer accentuated his unit's success by a careful
coordination of his four individual Staffeln so that the
enemy was never given an opportunity to rest, regroup, or
disengage. Gruppenkommandeur Meyer also contacted support-
ing Luftwaffe units to suppress ground fire enabling the
HS129s to operate at optimum effectiveness, i.e. low alti-
tude and minimum slant range at firing. Hauptmann Meyer
J
xarell, Op. Cit., p. 76.
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must have also had an excellent ground maintenance organiza-
tion which could rapidly refuel, reload and relaunch the
returning HS129s.
In recounting the successes of this historic first air-
craft/tank battle, the winning side possessed several note-
worthy characteristics. The German HS129 Kommandeur used
aggressive tactics, close coordination, rapid generation of
sorties, and the old Prussian dictum "Schussfeld geht vor
Deckung."* The higher echelon Luftwaffe commands were also
cognizant of the fact that in order to use resources at the
optimum level, the lower echelon commanders must be given
the authority commensurate with their responsibilities. In
a resource poor army, every attempt must be made to utilize
those resources available in the most efficient and effec-
tive manner possible. The actions of the Fourth Gruppe
,
Schlachtgeschwader Nine on 8 July 1943 are evidence of the
wisdom of this policy.
Viewing the situation in Europe today, with the masses
of Soviet armour opposing the qualitatively superior NATO
formations, Bruno Meyer's operation of 8 July 1943 can be a
valuable core of experience. Of course one can never fight
a battle before it begins. Frequently, however, the successful
*
"Ob tain a field of fire before cover."
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field commander is the one who can take advantage of an un-
foreseen opportunity that develops after the battle has
begun. Prior to the battle one can only use what information
is available at that time.
The assumption here is that NATO can use the A-10 (or
similar 30mm cannon equipped tactical aircraft) to effec-
tively combat the disproportionate number of Warsaw Pact
tanks. The actions of the HS129s at ZITADELLE proved the
practicality of using aircraft--unsupported by friendly
ground troops--to destroy large enemy armoured formations.
An analogous situation exists today in Europe with NATO
facing a numerically superior, but qualitatively inferior,
Warsaw Pact. All that is needed to complete the formula
for NATO success, in using aircraft against tanks, is an
update of the same basic tactics used by Bruno Meyer in
July 1943.
Among unclassified sources, the "Sokolovsky Papers" are
a prime informant of contemporary Russian military thought.
Sokolovsky emphasises that the massing of armour is still
the vital component in the "mass assault in the necessary
locale." However, with the advent of nuclear weapons these
forces must be dispersed prior to and after the massing for
a break-through in order to preclude a tempting nuclear
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35target. Sokolovsky stresses the need for "exceptional
flexibility" so that forces can concentrate and quickly
disperse again. It is at this point, of quick concentra-
tion of Soviet forces, that NATO anti-tank aircraft can be
most effective. If the Russians do indeed follow these
tactics, then speed is of the utmost criticality in counter-
ing the massed Soviet armoured formations. If the Soviets
can rapidly concentrate, attack, and subsequently disperse,
then NATO must counter these formations at the critical
time frame of concentration prior to attack . At this
critical juncture, flying anti-tank artillery is a weapon
which has, to date, not been exploited to anywhere near its
potential.
Based on the "Meyer Model," there is proof that aircraft
without the support of ground forces can effectively neutral-
ize enemy armoured formations. It is important to note,
that the "Meyer Model" is not a mathematical game or abstract
theory, the "Meyer Model" is fact. From this factual model
one can extract the elements that constituted success and
apply these elements to the probable scenario in Europe.
From the historical case it appears certain that the
tank destroying aircraft can add increased effectiveness
i5




and flexibility to NATO. With properly developed tactics
and aggressive implementation of them, in NATO, one could
theorize that an airborne anti-tank weapon system, which
can project the power of NATO well beyond the front lines,
could effect a neutralization of the Warsaw Pact's armoured




Looking at a map of Europe depicting the disposition of
Warsaw Pact anti-aircraft defenses, has a very sobering
effect on any proponent of an aggressive NATO airpower
strategy. Much of the shock, especially to USAF personnel,
is a result of the relatively permissive environment en-
countered during the Indo-China War. With the exception of
the major population centers of North Vietnam, and a few
local concentrations in South Vietnam and Laos, anti-air-
craft defenses were light to non-existent." With the recent
experience in Southeast Asia, a basic reorientation to
Europe is necessary on behalf of the USAF.
One can hypothecate that tactical aircraft losses will
be quite high--regardless of the mission. The Russians view
any hostilities in Europe as in the context of a short and
decisive drive to the English Channel. The NATO air forces
must be able to counter this Soviet thrust before its momen-
tum builds up to the point where it will overwhelm the NATO
*The author was assigned to SEA on four occasions over
the 1969-74 time frame, flying three different tactical
aircraft (F-4, A-7, F-105)
,
and flying in North Vietnam,
South Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia.
102
ground forces. In countering this Soviet thrust, NATO
losses in tactical aircraft will be quite high, but con-
sidering the criticality of the threat and projected short
duration of the conflict, they must be accepted, assuming
NATO is serious about its mission.
In observing the potential anti-aircraft threat in
Europe, one is confronted with an assortment of radar SAMs
,
infrared SAMs and radar controlled AAA. The primary con-
cern here is with aircraft carried 30mm cannon attacks
against tanks. It has been demonstrated historically that
bombs are not as an effective air-to-ground weapon for use
against tanks as 30 and 37mm airborne cannons (see previous
chapters) . There is no substantial evidence to support any
change in this historical precedent. As such, with the
optimum slant range of the GAU 8 30mm cannon at around 4000
feet slant range, tactical aircraft attacking tanks can
expect to be exposed to all three of the above mentioned
anti-aircraft systems. The high concentration of such anti-
aircraft systems in the Warsaw Pact will therefore extract
a high toll of NATO aircraft especially in the lower alti-
tudes where the anti-tank aircraft must operate to be
effective.
The legacy of Vietnam with the emphasis by USAF commanders,
in that theatre, on safety and sorties rates has permeated the
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USAF tactical doctrine. Considering the short duration of
projected operations in Europe, a basic reorientation of
attitudes on behalf of the USAF and its tactical commanders
is a vital prerequisite to successfully begin to counter
the Soviet threat in Europe.
Viewing the anti-aircraft order of battle in East and
Central Europe it is apparent that NATO will be taking very
heavy losses in close-air-support operations behind the
enemy lines. Airpower, however, does offer the capability
to strike the massing enemy prior to the enemy's attack in
force. NATO must, however, be prepared to accept high air-
craft losses to effect a neutralization, or at least blunting
of the enemy armoured striking forces. NATO's air forces,
then, must select the optimum aircraft(s) to maximize the
damage to the enemy while minimizing the cost to NATO.
The accompanying chart (see figure 4) depicts the ground-
based air defense potential of a Soviet Army Group (3-4
Divisions) . There are five Soviet Army Groups stationed in
the GDR (48:183) and each Army Group controls an air defense
sector approximately 50 kilometers wide and 100 kilometers
deep. The following air defense weapons and numbers thereof
are organic to a Soviet Army Group.
Miller, R. , "Europe's New Generation of Combat Aircraft
Part 1 - The Increasing Threat," International Defense Review ,
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Soviet Army Group Air Defense Net
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ZU-23-2- A total of 114 of these towed 23mm twin
cannon are deployed along the front-line of each
Soviet Army in a 5 km wide belt, and also generally
within the operational area. They are deployed in
19 batteries of six mounts each. The anti-aircraft
range of these weapons is 1,200 m. and the theoretical
maximum rate of fire is 2,000 rpm.
ZSU-23-4- 32 batteries of the 23mm quad cannon-armed
Shilka AA tank, forming a total of 128 vehicles are
also deployed along the 50 km front line, and gener-
ally throughout the operational zone. The ZSU-23-4
radar-directed mount has a theoretical maximum firing
rate of 4,000 rpm, and an effective range of 2,500m.
It showed itself to be a most lethal and effective
low-level AA weapons system during the October War.
ZSU-57-2- This twin 57mm AA tank is deployed in
smaller numbers throughout the Army area, with a total
of 36 vehicles divided into 6 batteries. The optically
controlled automatic cannon have a combined rate of
fire of 240 rpm, and are effective to a range of over
4,000 m. at high angles of elevation.
S-60- This radar-directed, single barrel towed AA
gun uses the same 57mm ordnance as the ZSU-57-2.
Its rate of fire is 120 rpm, and the effective range
is well over 4,000m. A total of 138 guns (in 23
batteries each with six guns) are deployed in three
belts across the breadth of each Soviet Army area.
The first belt is about 10 km. behind the Soviet
front line, with the second 15 km. and the third
about 25 km. behind.
SA-6- 5 batteries of the SA-6 missile system (each
consisting of one Straight Flush fire control radar
vehicle, one loader vehicle, and 3 twin launcher
vehicles) move close to the front of the advancing
Soviet Army Group. Three further batteries are
located 5 km behind the front line. They cover the
whole 50 km. front of that Army Group's area, ex-
tending up to 32 km. into NATO airspace at the maxi-
mum altitude of 10,000 m. , and up to 10 km. at an
altitude of 100 m. with an effective engagement radius
of 5 km. The two remaining batteries are deployed in
depth, some 10 km. further to the rear, filling the
central gaps between the three forward batteries.
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SA-4- 9 mobile SA-4 missile batteries are deployed
in the gaps between the SA-6 batteries. Each SA-4
battery has one Pat Hand fire control radar, one
loader vehicle, and three twin launcher vehicles.
The leading 3 batteries move at a distance of 10 km.
behind the Army Group's frontal units, reaching up
to 50 km. into NATO airspace at the maximum altitude
of about 15,000 m. The 6 remaining batteries move
in a lateral belt 25 km. behind the front, backing up
the 2 rear SA-6 batteries.
SA-2- Three batteries, each with 6 single SA-1 mobile
missile launchers, a Fan Song fire control radar, and
a loader vehicle, are deployed in the Army Group area.
The two forward batteries are located 45 km. from the
Soviet front. They can cover a range of about 8 km.
beyond this front, against medium/high altitude tar-
gets, to a maximum altitude of about 25,000 m. The
third SA-2 battery is located in the center of the
Army Group area, some 80 km. behind the advancing
front
.
The above described systems do not indicate the air
defense weapons common to all troops (rapid-fire AA guns,
MGs) , SA-7s, and 64 troops of BPJ)M-2 vehicles mounting quad-
2
ruple SA-9 launchers. A discussion of the possible weak-
nesses of the above air defense system will be included in
the concluding chapter.
One can expect the attacking enemy armoured units to
lose some of their anti-aircraft capability as they advance
into friendly territory. This is due to the normal logisti-
cal strains put on any attacking forces as it advances with




of supply. In effect then, the attacking armoured units
can be expected to lose a portion of their striking power
and defensive capability as they advance. Herein lies the
paradox: the enemy forces are more vulnerable as they
advance, but they are closer to friendly critical positions;
conversely if the friendly anti-tank aircraft are directed
at armoured units beyond the FEBA into enemy territory,
attacking aircraft will suffer higher losses, but they will
also blunt/neutralize the enemy's attacking strike force.
Although there has, of late, been considerable interest
and advancement in anti-tank weaponry, such as the TOW
missile and the GAU 8 30mm cannon, the Soviets still consider
the tank as the weapon system around which a striking force
is composed. The Soviets have, in fact, increased the
importance of their tanks:
"Ironically then, the recent Soviet concern over
anti-tank weapons has actually raised rather than
lowered the status of the tank. Practically all
of the articles have emphasized the greater vulner-
ability of the BMP. It is the BMP, not the tank,
which is perceived as the weak link in the combined
arms chain. "3
NATO is back to the position of facing an enemy bent on
maintaining the offensive. Anti-tank aircraft offer NATO
Karber, Phillip A., "The Soviet Anti-Tank Debate,"
Survival , Volume XVIII, Number 3, p. 109, May /June 1976.
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the option of blunting this massive enemy attack before its
full offensive weight can fall on NATO ground forces. Is
the potential loss in anti-tank aircraft worth the gain?
Before considering the above question an examination of
NATO anti-tank aircraft is in order. Chapter VI will cover
the A-10. Chapter VII will examine the alternatives; the




The A-10 is the first new generation USAF aircraft
specifically designed for the close-air support mission.
Close-air support is defined by the Joint Chiefs of Staff
as
:
"Air attacks against hostile targets which are in
close proximity to friendly forces and which require
detailed integration of each air mission with the
fire and movement of those forces."
As a result of air operations in SEA it was apparent
that the USAF did not possess a weapon's system that was
specifically tailored for the close-air support mission.
The A-10 is an attempt to fill this void. The basic con-
sideration for fulfilling the CAS mission require an air-
craft that can carry a large payload over a reasonable
distance, loiter in the target area for a considerable time,
operate under low ceilings in reduced visability and finally
to provide the accuracy necessary to support troops in
contact.
An additional role of close-air-support is of course
countering enemy armoured formations . In this area the
potential represented by the A-10 with the 30mm GAU 8 cannon
is a quantum leap over previous tactical aircraft capabilities
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against armoured vehicles. With the large disparities in
NATO armoured forces facing the armoured forces of the
Warsaw Pact, mentioned in previous chapters, the A-10 anti-
tank features represent a capability of tremendous advantage
in the European environment.
There are of course many uncertainties that preclude an
exact accounting of the effectiveness of the aircraft anti-
tank mission, however, there is not any question that the
A-10 represents an unparalleled advance over previous tacti-
cal aircraft in the anti-tank role. The ultimate test of
how effective tactical airpower will be in the anti-tank
mission can only be evaluated after combat operations
commenc e
.
Figure 5 on page 117 illustrates a number of possible
combat scenarioes for the A-10. The relatively low fuel con-
sumption and high payload capability of the A-10 are major
advantages in its flexibility. Basic specifications for
the A-10 are as follows:
A-10 Performance Characteristics :
Close air support radius 250 N.MI
Loiter at CAS radius 2 hours
Reconnaissance radius 406 N.MI
Escort radius 258 N.MI
^Tairchild Republic, A-10 , Fairchild Industries, p. 7,
1975.
Ill
Ferry range 2365 N.MI
Sustained load factors
at 150 Kts. 2.29 G
at 275 Kts 3.26 G
Instantaneous load factors
at 150 Kts. 2.34 G
at 300 Kts. 5.93 G
Combat speeds
with 6 MK-82 Bombs at 5000 Ft. 385 Kts.
clean sea level 390 Kts.
stabilized 45 degree speed 260 Kts.
Take-off distance
Maximum gross weight 3850 feet
Forward airstrip weight 1130 feet
Landing distance
Maximum gross weight 2140 feet
Forward airstrip weight 1085 feet
Dimensions
Total aircraft
Wing span 55 Ft in
Length 53 Ft 4 in
Height 14 Ft 8 in
Horizontal tail span 18 Ft 10 in
Wheel Tread 17 Ft 2.6 in
Wheel Base 17 Ft 8.76 in
Operational Mission Weights
Max take-off Forward airstrip
Weight 45,560 lbs 30,344 lbs
Number of pylons 11 11
Ammo rounds 1,350 750
External ordnance 9,540 lbs 2,120 lbs
No of MK 82 bombs 18 4
Internal fuel 10,650 lbs 4,228 lbs
Sustained Turn Radius
(5000 ft., tropical day, 6 MK 82s)
20 degree flaps 130 Kts. 1003 ft
150 Kts. 972 ft
170 Kts. 1176 ft
No flaps 200 Kts. 1305 ft
250 Kts. 1864 ft
300 Kts. 2598 ft
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The heart of the A-10 weapons system is the General
Electric GAU 8 30mm cannon. Basic characteristics of the
o






































10 2 second bursts with 1 min
cool time between bursts.
1975.
"General Electric, Gun Weapons System , General Electric,
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GAU-8/A Ammunition Characteristics
GAU-8/A Ammunition TP/HEI API
Cartridge Weight 1.530 lb. 1.65 lb.
Projectile Weight 0.814 lb. .94 lb.
Case Weight (7475 alum) 0.322 lb. avg.
Propellant Weight 148-156 gms . 150-156 gms
.
HE Weight 56 gms. min X
Cartridge Length 11.416 in. max.
Projectile Length 5.49 in. max.
Case Length 6,811 in. max.
Muzzle Velocity 3,400-3,450 ft/sec. 3,240 ft/sec
3GAU 8 Ammunition :
The GAU-8/A 30mm ammunition consists of a family of
ballistically matched projectiles which are currently under
development. They include Target Practice (TP) , High Ex-
plosive Incendiary (HEI) and Armour Piercing Incendiary (API)
rounds which are designed to defeat a wide range of close
air support targets such as trucks, armoured personnel
carriers and medium and heavy tanks. The HEI round employs
a standard M505 fuze and explosive mix with a body of
naturally fragmenting material that is effective against
lighter vehicle and materiel targets. The API round has a
light weight body which contains a subcaliber high density
penetrator of depleted uranium . The ballistics are optim-
ized to provide the maximum remaining energy at combat
ranges sufficient to defeat tanks and armoured personnel
carriers
.
The GAU-8/A ammunition incorporates aluminum cartridge
cases which reduce system weight significantly over brass or
steel cases. The round is percussion primed and the pro-
jectile uses plastic rotating bands instead of the conven-






























,; >:,,:-, , . :;,;,,, .,,
115
im.
The GAU-8 installed in the A-10
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Aircraft Escort Mission
ordnance: 8 XMK 82 bombs, 1350 ids ammo
Escort at 5000 ft
Cruise at 5000ft





Close Supporting Fire Mission 1
ordnance: 6*MK82 bombs, 750 rds ammo




combat 10 min. ? '
,
Low Altitude Mission




combat 5 min. " *
Close Supporting Fire Mission 2
ordnance: 6*MK.82 bombs, 750 rds. ammo
cruise at optimum altitude 3 nrs
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Full fuel-8xbombs: 305 nm
Armed Reconnaissance Mission
ordnance: 18xMK.82 bombs, 750 rds. ammo
Reconn. run at 5000 ft









Close Supporting Fire Mission 3
ordnance: 18xMK82 bombs, 750 rds ammo
cruise at optimum altitude ' " r -
45 min
-rj^^t*" \ loiter at
5000 ft
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150 nm- -239 nr










As a general comment on the A-10, one can say the key
to the aircraft's success lays in its ability to survive in
the heavily defended European environment. The main advan-
tages of the A-10 are: its rough and rugged construction,
armour protection for the pilot and vital systems of the
aircraft, the high payload capacity, the long loiter time,
and weapon's delivery accuracy. The A-10 also has the
capability for landing on unimproved airstrips and for rela-
tively short take-off and landing distances.
The main disadvantages of the A-10 are its slow speed
and large plan form. As such the A-10 is more likely to be
hit by AAA fire, although if hit the A-10 is more likely to
survive than conventional tactical aircraft without the
survivability features possessed by the A-10. One must
temper this slow speed characteristic with the realization
that speed is not an advantage when searching for concealed
enemy (personnel or equipment) on the ground. In Oberst
Rudel's words "When searching for hidden tanks, speed is
poison."^ The A-10 will also be able to operate in minimal
weather conditions where normal tactical aircraft at present
cannot.





For purposes of this thesis, two alternate anti-tank
aircraft will be discussed: the A-7 and the F-16. Both
aircraft, in preliminary studies, have been found to be
compatible with the 30mm D.U. ammunition used in the GAU-8
cannon.
The F-16 can carry the POD version GE cannon designated
the GAU-8A, however the F-16 appears to be more compatible
with a POD version of the Oerlikon KCA 30mm cannon (the
license for U.S. production held by Hughes Aircraft which
offers the Oerlikon KCA in an internal mounting -- see
Figure 6) .
The A-7 is an all weather, single seat, sub-sonic attack
fighter currently in operation with the USAF Tactical Air
Command. The A-7 is a combat tested weapons system, which
was used extensively in the Vietnam conflict by the U.S.
Navy and USAF. Basic characteristics of the A-7 are J
"
^Jane's All the World's Aircraft






Wing chord at root






38 ft 9 in (11-80 m)
23 ft 9 in (7*24 m)
15 ft 6 in (4-72 m)
3 ft 10% in (1-18 m)
4
46 ft Ik in (14-06 m)
16 ft 3/4 in (4-90 m)
18 ft 1% in (5-52 m)













375 sq ft (34*83 m2 )
19-94 sq ft (1-85 m2 )
43-48 sq ft (4-04 m2 )
48-74 sq ft (4-53 m2 )
4-60 sq ft (0-43 m2 )
3-44 sq ft (0-32 m2 )
111-20 sq ft (10-33 m2 )
15-04 sq ft (1-40 m2 )
56-39 sq ft (5-24 m2 )





19,781 lb (8,972 kg)
42,000 lb (19,050 kg)
Performance:
Max level speed at S/L
T-0 run at max T-0 weight
Ferry range:
max internal fuel
max internal and external
fuel
606 knots (698 mph;
1,123 km/h)
5,000 ft (1,525 m)
1,981 nm (2,281 miles;
3,671 km)
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The primary concern here is the anti-tank capability of
the A-7. The LTV Corporation that produces the A-7, com-
pleted a USAF directed study concerning the 30mm gun capa-
bility of the A-7 considered two types of cannon: the GE
GAU 8/A and the Oerlikon 304RK 30mm. Both cannon can use
the depleted uranium ammunition fired by the A-10's standard
GAU -8 30mm.
LTV study is broken down into two basic sections, in-
ternal mounting and external mountings . Internal mounting
of the GAU-8 gun is based on single seat production con-
figuration of the two-place A-7E currently being produced
for the U.S. Navy. A 30-inch diameter ammo drum and chute
system, containing 650 rounds, would be installed behind
the cockpit in a manner similar to the standard 20mm drum
currently used in the USAF A-7D. Installation of the larger
30mm drum is possible due to the increased length of the
fuselage which is retained when the aft cockpit is removed
(see Figure 8)
.
A twin set of Oerlikon 304RK guns can be installed in
a standard single-seat A-7D in a manner similar to the
twin mounting of the MK 12 20mm guns in the A-7A. and ATB
(see Figure 9) . A total of 464 rounds of 30mm ammunition
is stored aft of the cockpit. This installation requires
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A- 7 Oerlikon Twin Internal Mount
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spent casings. A comparison of the two internal 30mm mount-
ing options with the current 20mm M61A is shown in Figure 10,
The considerations for 30mm the GAU-8/0erlikon options are
displayed in Figure 11.
External options considered by LTV were: GAU-8/A pod,
Philco-Ford pod, and Hughes /Oerl ikon 304RK gun pod. A
typical pod installation is shown in Figure 12. The A-7
experience with the MK4 20mm podded gun has been successful.
Downward ejection of spent casings from 20mm pods has caused
no damage to the A-7 airframe. The inboard stations of the
A-7D/E (stations 3 and 6) are capable of carriage of all the
above mentioned 30mm cannon pod systems. No adverse aero-
dynamics effects or flying qualities are anticipated due to
the carriage of the larger 30mm gun pod. If a requirement
existed to fire one of the two pods at a time, then a pro-
grammed yaw input system would have to be installed in the
aircraft.
The A-7 would offer two main advantages as an anti-tank
aircraft over the A-10. The A-7 has approximately 50 per
cent less plan form area than the A-10, and the A-7 is
considerably faster (sea level top speed of 606 KTS versus
the A-10's 390). The A-7 has a combat proven, accurate
computer ordnance delivery capability. The above mentioned
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A-7 Typical Gun Pod Installation
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computed fire control system. The internal installation
of the GE GAU-8 and twin Oerlikon cannons both have a 5.6
2
mill continuously computed impact point accuracy. At
2000 feet slant range, this accuracy would equate to 11.2
feet. The pod installations have a considerably degraded
capability, only 9.8 mills.
The LTV study concludes:
1. 30mm guns are compatible with the A-7D, both
internal and external installations.
(GAU-8 installation requires fuselage stretch
similar to two-place A-7B.)
2. Internal installation provides most accurate
system.
3. GAU-8 has higher kill potential.
4. Areas requiring development testing:
a) Gun gas effects on engine operation
b) Yaw and pitch excursions verifications
c) Vibrations effects
d) Overall system in-flight reliability.
The A-7 does have several noteworthy disadvantages.
The aircraft is more vlunerable to a fatal AAA hit as it
does not have the armour protection advantage of the A-10,
The A-7 has no unimproved field capability and requires
2LTV, Report Number 2-55300/2R-8636, "A-7D 30mm Gun






generally longer runways for take-off and landing. The
A-7 has not been operationally tested with a 30mm gun pod
or internal 30mm mounting. The A-7's Allison TF41 FAN
engine has not proved to be reliable as other aircraft
currently possessed by the USAF. The A-7 does not have the
capability to fly as slow as the A-10. This is a vital
requirement in searching for camouflaged or hidden armoured
vehicles on the ground. Finally, there is the broader impli-
cations, within the NATO alliance, of standardizing weapons
systems. In this context it is difficult to imagine our
European allies purchasing an aircraft that is already 10
years old.
The F-16 is a single seat, single engined, MACH 2 light-
weight fighter. Basic performance characteristics are:
Dimensions, External:
Wing span over missile launchers
31 ft in (9-45 m)
Wing span over missiles 32 ft 10 in (10*01 m)
Wing aspect ratio 3.0
Length overall, excl probe:
YF-16 46 ft 6 in (14*175 m)
F-16A/B 47 ft 7*7 in (14*52 m)
Height overall:
YF-16 16 ft 3 in (4*95 m)
F-16A/B 16 ft 5*2 in (5*01 m)
Tailplane span 18 ft 0-34 in (5-495 m)
Wheel track 7 ft 9 in (2-36 m)
Wheelbase 13 ft 1-52 in (4-00 m)






YF-16 280-0 sq ft (26-01 m2 )
F-16A/B 300-0 sq ft (27-87 m2 )
Weights and Loadings (F-16A)
:
Operational empty weight
approx 14,060 lb (6,377 kg)
Max external load 15,200 lb (6,894 kg)
Structural design gross weight (7-33g) with full
internal fuel 22,500 lb (10,205 kg)
Max T-0 weight:
YF-16, max weight at which flown
27,000 lb (12,247 kg)
F-16A with max external load
33,000 lb (14,968 kg)
Wing loading:
at 22,000 lb (10,070 kg) AUW
74 lb/sq ft (361 kg/m2 )
at 33,000 lb (14,968 kg) AUW
110 lb/sq ft (537 kg/m2 ) .
Thrust/weight ratio (clean) 1-1 to 1
Performance (YF-16, as assessed in NATO Steering
Committee report, March 1975)
:
T-0 weight, clean, with 2 Sidewinders
21,600 lb (9,797 kg)
External load with max internal fuel
11,500 lb (5,216 kg)
Thrust/weight ratio at 21,600 lb (9,797 kg)
1-1 to 1
Max level speed at 36,000 ft (11,000 m) with 2
Sidewinders Mach 1*95
Max rate of climb in 5g turn at low level at
Mach 0-7, with 6 MK 82 bombs
42,000 ft (12,802 m) /min
Sustained turn rate at 20,000 ft (6,100 m) with
max internal fuel and 2 Sidewinders
10-7°/sec.
Sustained air turning radius at low level at Mach 0*7
with 6 MK 82 bombs, 4,500 ft (1,372 m)
T-0 run with 4,000 lb (1,814 kg) external load
1,750 ft (533 m)
Landing run with 4,000 lb (1,814 kg) external load
2,650 ft (808 m)
Radius of action with 6 MK 82 bombs
295 nm (340 miles; 547 km).
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A look at the dimensions of the aircraft (see Figure 13)
reveals that the F-16 is considerably smaller than the tac-
tical aircraft currently possessed by the USAF.
The F-16 can carry the GE GAU-8/A 30mm gun on the inboard
wing station if it is counter balanced by a fuel tank on the
opposite wing. The adverse yaw while firing and the asymetri-
cal characteristics of carrying dissimilar loads on opposite
wings, make this option impracticable. The other pod 30mm
(D.U. capable) cannon considered by General Dynamics for the
F-16 is the Oerl ikon/Hughes model 34 pod. This cannon is
essentially the same one described above for use in the A-7.
The Hughes model 34 pod is mounted on stations 4 and 6 of
the F-16 (see Figure 6) and each pod carried a total of 125
rounds
.
Internal 30mm options for the F-16 are limited to the
Oerlikon KCA. This is basically the same revolver cannon
used for the model 34 pod. The Oerlikon KCA internal mount-
ing carries a total of 135 30mm rounds. (See Figure 5.)
Accuracies are not available as of this writing, however
they can be expected to be on the order of those accuracies
listed for the A-7 internal and 30mm versions.
The F-16 has basically the same advantages of the A-7;
higher speed, and smaller plan form. The F-16 is also well
on the way to becoming the standard NATO fighter of the
135
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future. It is also a multi -miss ion aircraft with air-to-
air, air-to-ground and close-air support capability.
The F-16 disadvantages stem from its being a new weapons
system. It is not operationally, or combat proven. One
can assume that the F-16 will have a capability to destroy
enemy armoured vehicles - as the Oerlikon 30mm round is
essentially the same as the GAU-8 30mm round, however, it
has yet to be operationally tested. The F-16 does not have
the capability to fly slow enough to be able to detect
hidden and camouflaged enemy armoured vehicles. The F-16
also does not have any unimproved air field capability.
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CHAPTER VIII
A Meeting with Oberst Rudel
In conjunction with research for this thesis, the author
determined that it would be necessary to travel to the Federal
Republic of Germany (hereafter referred to as FRG) and in-
vestigate first-hand sources there. The principle objective
was the Bundesarchiv-Militarachiv located at Freiburg im
Breisgau, West Germany. Through the good offices of Dr.
Horst Boog of the Militargeschichtliches Forschungsamt
. also
located in Freiburg, the author was able to obtain the
address of Brigadegeneral a.D. Paul-Werner Hozzel, who had
been a prominent Stuka pilot during World War Two. Corre-
spondence with General Hozzel was most encouraging and the
author was able to obtain an inverview with the General at
his office in Karlsruhe, FRG.
Prior to departing for Europe in June 1976, the author
was determined to locate Oberst Rudel. However, the only
information available on Rudel was that he had been living
in Kufstein, Austria in 1970. In spite of such scant in-
formation, Oberst Rudel was deemed so important, for his
military knowledge and experience, that the author was willing
to go to any extreme to locate the famous "tank killer."
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The author arrived in the FRG at Frankfurt am Main
airport on a Friday. The entire weekend was free as the
Bundesarchiv-Militarachiv is opened only during weekdays
.
The author elected to go to Kufstein, Austria and see if
Rudel could be located. Oberst Rudel does, in fact, reside
in Kufstein, but when the author arrived and inquired as to
Herr Rudel' s whereabouts, his housekeeper informed the
author that Rudel was in Chicago, Illinois, for medical
treatment related to a stroke that he had suffered in 1969.
The housekeeper was kind enough to give the author the
address in Chicago where Oberst Rudel was staying during his
medical treatment. Returning to the United States, the
author went directly to Chicago and was able to contact
Rudel and arrange an interview, which took place on 28 June
1976. (see Appendix XI)
.
Subsequent to this interview with Oberst Rudel, the
author determined that the Fairchild-Hiller Corporation and
the USAF were interested in meeting Rudel for purposes of
exploiting his knowledge of anti-tank air operations and
experience on the German Eastern Front during the Second
World War.
The author was able to relay an invitation on behalf of
the Fairchild-Hiller Corporation to Oberst Rudel to attend,
as the main speaker, an aircraft anti-tank seminar to be
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held in Washington D. C. on 14-15 October 1976. The author
accompanied Oberst Rudel to the seminar and made some of
the arrangements for his visit.
The author met Oberst Rudel, again in Chicago, on Sunday
10 October 1976 and remained with him until the following
Saturday (16 October) when Rudel departed for the FRG. In
the course of this week with the foremost tank hunter and
especially the very productive seminar on 14 and 15 October,
several important, heretofore unstudied, facts emerged.
The salient points include the following:
1. The ratio of anti-tank aircraft lost versus tanks
destroyed was approximately 1:20.
2. The ratio of anti-tank pilots lost versus tanks
destroyed was approximately 1:40.
3. Absolute weather minimums for JU87G Stuka employ-
ment were 30 meters (100 feet) ceiling and 3 kilo-
meters visibility.
4. Enemy and friendly ground positions were often
so fluid and intertwined that Oberst Rudel was only
able to identify friendly ground troops by making an
extremely low pass (5-10 meters) above the ground
and look for the distinctive silhouette of the German
helmet.
5. Approximately one half of the Schlachtflieger who
were shot down were recovered by friendly forces.
6. Schlachtflieger on the Eastern Front could expect
6-7 days off each year.
7. Oberst Rudel considered the backseater of the
Stuka as a vital component of the capability of the
anti-tank aircraft as it allowed the pilot to give
his undivided attention to searching for concealed
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enemy tanks, while the backseater was looking for
enemy aircraft of other distractions.
8. For a pilot to record a tank as "killed" he
had to fulfill three requirements:
a. The tank had to explode internally.
b. The tank had to burn.
c. The tank in question had to be observed by
another party, other than the pilot making the
claim.
9. Oberst Rudel estimates his de facto score of
tanks destroyed as approximately three times the
de Jure figure of 519.
10. Rudel considers the single most important
factor in his success, and that of the Schlachtflieger
as a whole, was der Geist
. or spirit. That quality
of will power or espirt de corps which motivated men
beyond their normal means
.
11. Rudel does not feel that he could have survived
the war, were it not for his attention to his physical
conditioning, which was practiced on a daily basis.
(He would jog 10 kilometers each day.)
What sort of man is Rudel? What are the characteristics
that make a man capable of achieving his magnitude of accom-
plishment? Basic facts can explain a lot of Rudel 's charac-
ter. He was promoted to Oberst at the age of 28 and
simultaneously awarded the Golden Oakleaf with Swords and
Diamonds to the Knight's Cross of the Iron Cross, (this
was Germany's highest decoration in World War Two, only one
*"Das Goldene Eichenlaub mit Schwerten und Brillanten
zum Ritterkreuz des Eiserner Kreuzes."
Just, Gunther, Stuka -Oberst , p. 43, Motorbuch Verlag,
1975.
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of which was minted- -for Oberst Rudel alone, see Appendix
VIII) . He sank the Russian battleship Murat, with one bomb
that had the good fortune of hitting the ship's main munitions
storage area. After being downed behind enemy lines and
captured by the Russians, Rudel escaped and in the process
was wounded by rifle fire. In spite of serious loss of blood
he traveled, on foot, 60 kilometers during the course of one
night --evading Russian formations --without any heavy cloth-
ing or shoes, finally arriving back to German held territory.
An objective analysis of Rudel also reveals:
1. Experience as Staffelkapitan , Gruppenkomodeur ,
and Geschwaderkommandore .
2. Very traditional and solid middle class background.
3. Best-selling author.
4. 2530 combat sorties.
5. Shot down--by ground fire--over 30 times.
6. Scored 11 air-to-air kills.
7. A non-drinker and non-smoker.
8. Expert pilot, but slow learner.*
9. A deeply religious man.
Subjectively Oberst Rudel is not the sort of man whom
one would suspect had accomplished so much and received
*>vSee Stuka Pilot , a little reading between the lines on
chapter concerning training will confirm Rudel 's slow learning
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such tremendous notoriety. He is a warm and gregarious
person. One is almost infected with his dynamism, even
after a very serious stroke, which left his right side
paralyzed, Oberst Rudel walks three full hours every day
and swims for an hour when facilities are available. He
is a man of extreme will power and resolution. He is a
firm believer in the values of Western Civilization and
has an undying animosity toward Bolshevism.
If NATO pilots were all duplicates of Oberst Rudel, then
NATO's air forces could probably destroy any Warsaw Pace in-
vasion of Western Europe by airpower alone. NATO's pilots
are not Rudels , but by identifying the factors that made
Oberst Rudel such a successful pilot, one can hope to develop
such factors in the pilots that are being trained for possible
combat operations in Europe.
Above all Rudel was an unusually aggressive pilot. He
even considers it a miracle that he was able to survive the
war. A closer look at Rudel will indicate that while he
was very aggressive, his real motivation was an undying be-
lief in the righteousness of his cause and an unshakable
empathy with the soldier on the ground. The aggressive
attitude, belief in a cause and feeling of comradship can
all be summed up in one word: der Geist .
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Oberst Rudel, in his closing remarks to the anti-tank
seminar made the importance of Geist very clear. He said
that the new A-10 aircraft with the 30mm GAU 8 cannon was
a giant step in the right direction toward neutralizing the
Russian threat to Western Europe, but without the quality
of Geist to motivate the troops, it would all come to naught
How commanders can inject the quality of Geist into the
soldiers of NATO is beyond the scope of this thesis, it is
mentioned only to illustrate that technology does not win




The anti-tank options available to the USAF today, i.e.,
operationally ready deployed tactical fighter units, are nil.
Although all tactical aircraft in the USAF inventory could
be equipped with Rockeye-type cluster bomblettes, it has
been historically demonstrated that this type of munitions
has limited utility considering possible employment situa-
tions. The main problem, with cluster munitions as well as
a variety of "smart bombs, 11 is that of weather. The limit-
ing effect of weather in Europe on flying operations is
great; there are simply too many days on which tactical air-
power would be useless if the weapons loads consisted of only
"smart bombs" or cluster type bombs. The pilots of the air-
craft would not be able to achieve the release parameters
required of such munitions assuming of course that they
were able to find enemy armoured formations in the first
place.
On the other hand, 30mm cannon equipped tactical air-
craft are in many cases already below the weather, because
the optimum effective slant range for employment of the
30mm cannon is approximately in the 4000 foot range. For
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an immediate increase in the capability of USAF tactical
units in Europe, one solution would be the equipping of
fighter aircraft with a 30mm gun pod. The General Electric
GAU-8/A and the Hughes -Oerlikon model 34 pod would appear
to be the best options of those which are presently avail-
able (See Appendix XII) . The near future for tank hunting
appears to be considerably brighter with the introduction
of the A-10 with its 30mm gun into the operational inventory;
and the following conclusions will deal largely with employ-
ment of the A-10 weapons system.
As the A-10 is, in many respects, a completely new type
of aircraft for the USAF with unique capabilities and
characteristics, a new conceptual doctrine of employment
must be developed to exploit the vast potential of this new
weapons system. Essentially the A-10 will be used as an
airborne platform to aid ground forces in Europe in combat-
ing the huge disparity between NATO and Warsaw Pact forces,
especially in tanks, (See Introduction).
The A-10 is a new type of weapons system for the USAF,
however, the historically preceding weapons JU87G and HS129
of World War Two can be instructively studied and, indeed,
the basic analogy between the JU87G/T-34 and the A-10/T-62
does seem to have much validity. The relative cost figures
tank reverse aircraft, have changed considerably; for example,
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the A-10 aircraft is relatively much more expensive than
the current Soviet MBT, T-62. The basic confrontation of
forces and probable kill ratios in favor of aircraft appear
to hold when comparing available data from World War Two
with projected kill ratio today. It is particularly impor-
tant to emphasize that while the USAF combat experience with
anti-tank cannon aircraft is presently nonexistent, there is
still a tremendous core of experience in the form of the
Luftwaffe personnel who operated on the Eastern Front in
World War Two. The Luftwaffe case indicates the need for:
1. Forward basing of aircraft assets.
2. Capability for rapid generation of sorties.
3. Close coordination and identification with friendly
ground troops
.
Forward basing is necessary in order to achieve the mini-
mum time between the call for, and the actual employment of,
air support. Airpower offers the most effective means of
rapidly concentrating firepower on an armoured breakthrough
where ground forces are not strong enough to counter the
enemy formations. As such, every minute is vital and the
only way to close potential gaps is to have aircraft close
to the front line ground units.
NATO does not possess unlimited air resources, and the
most efficient and effective use of available assets is
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necessary. In some important ways the number of aircraft
possessed is irrelevant; what is important is how many
sorties can be generated and how quickly. For example a
squadron with 10 aircraft that can each fly 5 times a day,
is more effective than a squadron with 20 aircraft which
only fly twice a day. The same line of reasoning is true
of pilots . The sortie generation rate is also important
in keeping pressure on the enemy tank force and precluding
its disengagement as illustrated in the "Meyer Model" (see
Chapter IV)
.
The close coordination and identification with ground
forces is especially important. Never before has the success
of an airborne weapons system depended so much on the actual
support it can give to friendly ground troops. A human link
is necessary to provide the required liaison with the ground
commander and to direct in some cases the actual fire support
that is delivered by the aircraft. The liaison officer must
be well versed in the operational concepts and capabilities
of the air and ground forces in which he serves as a vital
component.
The tank hunting squadrons can be thought of as units
built around a weapon rather than a weapons platform. The
weapon is the high velocity, rapid fire 30mm cannon. The
individual commander, for example, of a squadron-sized self
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contained organization would be a leader in the offensive
sense and also, in light of the need to protect his mobile
airfield perimeter, a defensive sense. The squadron-sized
unit is an instructive one to consider because of its rela-
tively high mobility, ease of dispersal, and optimum offen-
sive capability, as a function of command and closeness of
unit personnel. A rough mission-oriented organization









w/30mm Cannon w/30mm Cannon
The commander in the above model is responsible for conducting
tank hunting operations under the command of a regional overall
Air Forces commander and working in close coordination with
the local ground forces commander. The commander is also
responsible to a degree for his own anti-aircraft on ground
perimeter defense.
The commander's responsibilities are somewhat simplified
because the powerful 30mm General Electric and Oerlikon type
30mm cannons can destroy most armoured vehicles from the
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ground. The cannon has, furthermore, the potential for
being an excellent anti-aircraft system. With the optimi-
zation of personnel resources as a prime goal within NATO,
using personnel for occasional duty as AA gunners or peri-
meter defense has the advantage of releasing ground units
for offensive employment against the enemy.
By using the same weapons for perimeter defense, anti-
aircraft defense, and offensive air operations, the logistics
and the weapons maintenance systems are simplified, and per-
sonnel are utilized in a more efficient manner. The command-
er's primary responsibility is, of course, offensive air
operations in support of friendly ground units, but in
order to conduct offensive operations he must be able to
secure his operating base and generate a maximum number of
sorties. Basing the air assets far to the rear in large
concentrations presents a tempting target for the enemy, it
places the air support further away from the front lines
where it is needed, and moves the air commander too far
away from the ground commander, physically and empathetically
,
whom he is supposed to support.
The A-10 platform can be expected to operate offensively
in three basic roles:




In the "Meyer Model," the aircraft would be operating inde-
pendently in a tank hunter strike mode, whereby the aircraft
would seek out and then destroy enemy armoured forces.
Interdiction would involve air strikes at pre-designated
areas where enemy armoured forces were determined to be
located. Close-air-support, finally, would involve the
support of ground units, in defensive or offensive postures,
which had encountered enemy opposition which required heavy
fire power.
Tactics for the type of mission envisaged for the A-10
have to be built around an optimum slant range of 4000 feet
for the 30mm GAU-8 cannon. The relatively close slant range
first of all, puts the attacking aircraft with the range of
just about every anti-aircraft weapons system possessed by
the enemy. However the situation is not so bleak as it
initially appears. Because the A-10 must operate close to
the ground, it has several advantages: terrain masking from
threat radars, exposure to limited observation (the aircraft
can only be seen from the immediate area over which it is
flying) , and within easy reach at the low altitude blind
areas of many surface-to-air missiles systems (it is diffi-
cult to track an aircraft on radar at treetop level)
.
Especially important is the fact that all the assets that
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the enemy puts into SAM systems and sophisticated radar
warnings are assets that he takes away from conventional
AAA defense with probable significant increase in the sur-
vivability of the A-10 because the main threat, with which
the A-10 is concerned, is barrage AAA fire.
In order to detect concealed enemy tanks, the A-10, in
some tactical situations will have to fly slowly so that the
pilot will be able to spot the tanks on the ground. The
slow speed requirement is a case of the pilots having to
"bite the bullet." There is no way to discover a well
hidden enemy by flying over him at supersonic speeds. A
pilot becomes a fighting man similar to the basic infantry-
man whom he supports. The USAF cannot hope to make its
presence felt unless it is willing to employ its pilots in
a manner where they can bring pressure to bear on the enemy,
and in the context of the A-10, this pressure requires an
aggressive willingness to seek out and destroy the enemy on
the ground.
Once the enemy is discovered, it is absolutely critical
that he not be allowed to escape. If the Air Force is to
do its job in Europe relative to anti-tank defense, the
enemy armour must be destroyed, preferably before it has
the chance to come into contact with friendly ground forces.
Once discovered by air a constant pressure must be kept up
152
on the enemy until his armoured formations are destroyed.
The enemy must not be given a chance to regroup, disengage,
or seek cover; he must be ruthlessly destroyed.
The Warsaw Pact ground forces have shortcomings relative
to their logistics support. The ZSU 23/4, for example,
carries only a 65 rounds per magazine for each barrel and
therefore "the 23/4 can fire but three short bursts against
an incoming target and possibly one more as it recedes."
This is one example which supports the point that NATO air
forces, to be used at the optimum level, must keep constant
pressure on the enemy, once he has executed his initial push
and expended or substantially reduced his first issue of
ammunition. A corollary would be that NATO commanders must
not get "cold feet" after the first rather heavy losses
encountered by friendly air units, for if the initial losses
are to be made good, the follow-on sorties must be made in
order to take advantage of reduced air defense strength and
exposure of the armoured formations to close range attack
with guns
.
Preparation for the future deployment of an aircraft anti-
tank package involves a tremendous effort in the area of
training. The primary human resource is, of course, the
International Defense Review , Op. Cit., p. 182
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pilots who will be flying the A-10 and subsequent models
of aircraft in combat. The training of the pilots is of
the upmost importance if the weapons system is to be effec-
tively and efficiently employed. The future anti-tank pilot
must have complete knowledge of his weapons system, its
advantages, disadvantages, capabilities and shortcomings.
He must also have a basic understanding of, and empathy for,
the ground troops, whom he is supporting. Thorough indoc-
trination in Army ground tactics and command and control
systems is mandatory. As opposed to USAF experience in the
past, the anti-tank pilot of the future will be working in
close coordination with friendly ground units and close-in
among the enemy armoured attacking forces. If the friendly
ground and air forces cannot communicate and work in close
harmony with each other, the combat potential may not be up
to the task of successful defense and counter-attack in
Europe.
Because NATO is outnumbered by the Warsaw Pact forces,
NATO must do more with less. It is imperative, therefore,
that the limited personnel resources be utilized to the
maximum extent possible. One suggestion would be to cross-
train a squadron's maintenance and ground support personnel,
as well as pilots to serve as the AAA and perimeter defense
forces for the squadron's airfield. The point has already
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been made that the 30mm cannon can be used defensively as
well as offensively. Why not use the integral squadron
personnel for tasks other than those associated with the
actual flying operation? The mission of the flying unit
is keeping the aircraft in the air engaged with the enemy,
part of this function is having a secure base from which to
operate. There is no reason why the associated squadron
personnel cannot fulfill this defensive function- -or at
least augment forces detailed for those functions.
The commander has the key task of tying the whole opera-
tion together. To make his organization, effective mobile
and self sufficient as possible, he must be intimately
familiar with all aspects of his squadron, both flying and
non-flying. Above all he must demonstrate the flexibility
to get the job done. He must innovatively seek to have
his aircraft on target and ready to fight, when and where
they are required and in sufficient numbers to successfully
counter the enemy opposition.
Mobility is a key to bringing about a concentration of
fire power, at the right time and place to effect the favor-
able outcome of a battle. Flying anti-tank units must
therefore be as self-contained as possible, in order to be
able to concentrate their fire power. The aircraft alone
cannot be mobile, the entire organization must be able to
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pack up and relocate within a minimum amount of time.
Standardization of defensive and offensive weapons aids
this mobility as well as a basic simplification of systems
so that they can be kept in good working order with a mini-
mum amount of service.
Simple, rugged, easy to maintain systems, that can be
serviced under the most severe field conditions are keys
to mobility. A minimum amount of AGE (Aerospace Ground
Equipment) that can be packed, unpacked and ready to operate
also aids the unit's mobility. Finally to move a unit intra
-
theatre, due to a fluid battlefield situation, as much of the
units transport as possible should be organic to the unit--
within the constraints of cost of course. One option, that
has to date not been exploited, is the possible use of
glider aircraft to aid in the logistics needs of the unit.
All AGE and personnel belonging to the unit could be trans-
ported by glider which in turn would be towed by A-10 air-
craft during deployment. During the employment phase,
gliders could be used to augment the normal logistics
requirements of the unit.
Standardization within the flying unit has already been
discussed. In the broader context, standardization within
NATO would greatly increase the effectiveness of forces.
The goal would be to make the A-10, or its successor, the
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standard anti-tank/close-air-support aircraft for all NATO
air forces. This would, however, require a quid pro quo
arrangement. From the U.S. viewpoint, standardization within
NATO cannot be a one way street. As defense costs are borne
by all NATO allies, the U.S. cannot expect all of the defense
outlays to eventually wind up in the U.S. If a U.S. air-
craft is to be the standard, then the U.S. must consent to
having production rights given to NATO allies, or at a mini-
mum having component parts produced in NATO countries. The
U.S. cannot hope to produce an atmosphere of collective
defense of Europe by dictating to loyal allies.
There are factors in the A-10 which make it less of an
anti-tank aircraft than what it could have been. Hindsight,
of course, is particularly clear, but learning from the past
must be pursued. The U.S. Government has committed approxi-
mately $4 billion dollars on the production and procurement
of the A-10, primarily to be able to provide close-air-support
and kill tanks from the air. Yet, until this thesis was
begun no one had taken it upon himself to consult with Oberst
Rudel, who is the most experienced anti-tank pilot in the
world . Other lessons can be learned from history and our
contemporary NATO allies. Fostering a spirit of mutual
cooperation and trust can only work to the establishment of
a beneficial and mutually profitable relationship on both
sides of the Atlantic.
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APPENDIX I
List of equivalent Luftwaffe officer ranks.
*








































*The equivalent ranks for General Officers apply only to
World War II. The new German Air Force follows the American
pattern; for example a Major General in the new GAF is
called a Generalmajor, a Lieutenant General is a General
-
leutnant.





1. Luftflotte Luftflotte Luftflotte Luftflotte
2. Fliegerdivision Fliegerdivision
3. Geschwader Geschwader Geschwader
4. Stab I Gruppe II Gruppe III Gruppe IV Gruppe
5. Stab 1 Staffel 2 Staffel 3 Staffel 4 Staffel
6. Schwann Schwann Schwann Schwann
7. Rotta Rotta Rotta Rotta
Key:
1. Luftflotten were organized on a geographical basis.
They contained all types of aircraft (fighters, bombers,
transport, etc.). Depending on the theatre, strength could
vary from 200 to 1300 aircraft.
2. A Fliegerdivision , later Fliegerkorps , could operate
separately or under a Luftflotte . A Fliegerdivision had
all types of aircraft and strength varied from 200 to 750
aircraft.
3. The Geschwader was the largest formation with a set
strength, normally 150 aircraft; organized into 3 Gruppen
with a Stabgruppe consisting of 4 aircraft. A Geschwader
would be organized around a particular mission, but not
necessarily have all the same kind of aircraft, for example
a Schlachtgeschwader might have Gruppen of HS129s, JU87Gs
and FW190s. The name of the Geschwader would indicate its
mission: e.g. Jadgeschwader for air superiority.
4. A Gruppe had nominally 50 aircraft organized into 3
Staffeln and a Stabstaffel with 3 aircraft. A IV Gruppe
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was added to some Geschwader as a field testing unit, or
examining new equipment in combat, or training. Later some
Schlachtgeschwader formed the IV Gruppe into a tank destroy'
ing Gruppe . A Gruppe would contain only one type of air-
craft, under normal circumstances.
5. A Staffel usually had from 9 to 16 aircraft. 3 to 4
Staffeln made up a Gruppe .
6. A Schwarm or Kette (used for fighters only) has 4 or 3
aircraft. A Schwann was the basic in-flight combat forma-
tion, roughly equivalent to a USAF flight.
7. Rotta was the smallest Luftwaffe unit consisting of a
2 or 3 aircraft formation.
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APPENDIX III
Penetration Performance of Tugns ten-Carbide Ammunition
Weapon Aircraft Slant Range at Angle of Penetration
Firing-meters Impact Capability -mm
MK 103



















































Source: Karlsruhe Document Collection (K113.3019-3/frame 1826)
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APPENDIX IV
Characteristics of Oberst Rudel's 37mm Ammunition
and Comparison to 30mm Armour Piercing GAU-8 Ammunition



















































The GAU-8 30mm API Round
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APPENDIX V
Order reorganizing S tukageschwader into Schlachtgeschwader
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APPENDIX VI
Order renaming Chief of close-air-support units to
General der Schlachtflieeer
HsrgQSfOilt im BUNOESARfHIV - MllltorarchlV- yn«ii*rg«b* dit:*r tutnohnt nichl gatlalUt: HtfiMuttioo nut mil knlitliunti b*u»nn<ieuf<t|
!
LuftflottenJcocmando 5 l^-lsM** s-fc»Qu.,den 17*1**43,. Jwi. 3
0.ai.2Tr« 11615/43 gen.Ib j - -.-»..*.?
AS . : 11 b f "" ' ' ''-*««*a*6r"i««r*
Betr.: Unbenennung clsr Dienststalle Saaaral*ttBT fTahlai-.pJ.gllcg'q je .—'
Bezng: Lfl.Kdo.5i 0.;u.Kr. lo337/43 geh.Ib t.lA»9.43. *
Gemass Verfdgtuig E.R.d.L.u.Cb.d.L. ,Genst.Gen.Qu.2.Ab"t
.




General der Scnlacntflioger (Gen.d.Schlacfrtfl. )
.
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Source: Erickson, John, Soviet-Warsaw Pact Force Levels ,
USSI Rpt 76-2.
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The Order of the Iron Cross. World War II
The Order of the Iron Cross is awarded in the following
sequence:
1. The Iron Cross, 2d Class
2. The Iron Cross, 1st Class
3. The Knight's Cross to the Iron Cross
4. The Knight's Cross to the Iron Cross with Oak Leaves
5. The Knight's Cross to the Iron Cross with Oak Leaves
and with Swords
6. The Knight's Cross to the Iron Cross with Oak Leaves
and Swords and Diamonds
7. The Knight's Cross to the Iron Cross with Golden Oak
Leaves and Swords and Diamonds
8. The Great Cross of the Iron Cross
NOTE:
The #3 award, the Knight's Cross, was won by approximately
7500 military men.
The #4 award, The Oak Leaves, was won by 860 military men.
The #5 award, The Swords award, was won by 154 military men.
The #6 award, The Brilliants (or Diamonds), was won by 27
military men.
The #7 award, with Golden Oak Leaves, was won only by famed
Stuka pilot Hans Ulrich Rudel.
The #8 award, The Great Cross, was issued only to Reichsmarschall
Hermann Goering.
Approximately 1730 Luftwaffe personnel won The Knight's Cross.
192 won The Oak Leaves.
41 won The Oak Leaves and Swords
.
10 won The Oak Leaves, Swords and Diamonds.
1 won The Golden Oak Leaves, Swords and Diamonds (Rudel).




Schematic Presentation of Control of an Armoured Breakthrough
on the Eastern Front, South, 1944
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APPENDIX X
Interview Brigadegeneral a.D. Paul-Werner Hozzel
MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD
4 July 1976
Subject : Interview with Brigadegeneral a. D. Paul-Werner
Hozzel. Interview held at Karlsruhe, West Germany on 24 June
1976 from 1000 hours to 1230 hours and from 1430 hours to
1630 hours. Conducted in German.
Personal data : General Hozzel entered military service in
1931. He volunteered for pilot training, and transferred to
the Luftwaffe . He attended pilot training, instrument flying
training, dive bomber school and fighter school. His war
service included posting as S taffelkapitan , Gruppenkommandeur
.
and Geschwaderkommodore . In March 1943 General Hozzel was
posted to a logistics command covering the Crimea, Black Sea
and Kuban areas. In January 1944 he attended an abbreviated
General Staff course at the Kriegsakademie in Berlin. From
the Kriegsakademie he was assigned to the Staff of Luftflotte 1
(Kurland) where he ended the war as Chief of Staff Luftflotte 1
with the rank of Oberstleutnant i.G. . although the position
called for a General Officer. For the next eleven years
General Hozzel was a Russian POW. Decorations include the
Oak Leaf to the Knights Cross of the Iron Cross. After return
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to the Bundesrepublik . General Hozzel entered the new
Luftwaffe as an Oberstleutnant and retired in 1969 as a
Brigadegeneral . Today General Hozzel is employed by an
administration academy in Karlsruhe, West Germany.
THE INTERVIEW
Question : In general how effective were the Schlachtgeschwader
in anti-tank defense?
Answer : Good. My personal experience was only with bombing
and not the cannon equipped JU87G. Due to slow speed, poor
aerodynamics and limited maneuverability the JU87G could not
operate far behind the enemy front. The JU87G was normally
only used for attacks against tanks that had broken through
the front lines. With regard to bombing tanks, we used the
250 kilogram bomb with the Panzerbrecherkopf (tank busting
head) or the 250 kilogram Flammbombe (similar to napalm)
.
These were used very successfully in the initial battle for
Stalingrad in Sept-Oct 1942, where I commanded 4 Stukagruppen
working with the 6th Army of Generaloberst Paulus . In deliv-
ering these bombs the attack would start at 1000 meters
altitude. Deliveries for the bombs would be in a 30 to 45
degree dive angle and a release on sight picture. It was
necessary to be very exact in the delivery as the bomb would
have to impact under the enemy tank to effect a kill.
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Question : Generalleutnant Plocher has said that anti-tank
defense was the most important task of the Luftwaffe after
the autumn of 1943; however, there were few aircraft avail-
able for that specific purpose. Can you clarify this point?
Answer : I agree with the exception of one fighter bomber
Geschwader Fock-Wiilf 190
. there was not an aircraft in
existence at that time that was capable of operating behind
the front. I have already pointed out the problems with
the JU87G.
Question : Aircraft production in 1944 exceeded 40,000 units,
yet you mention shortages at the front. What happened to all
of these aircraft?
Answer : I am not certain about your figure of 40,000 aircraft
being produced in 1944. I am giving you a picture of reality
at the front as a S taffelkapitan % Gruppenkommandeur , and
Geschwaderkommodore , if we had had those 40,000 aircraft at
the front we would not have lost the war. Losses were quite
heavy in combat and accidents. For example, I was a commander
of 2 Gruppen at the battle of Moscow in 1941, from these 2
Gruppen with a nominal strength of 100 aircraft we could put
only 3 to 6 into the air each day, by open fires, as the engine
heaters were frozen in the mud. Were it not for the weather
and associated maintenance problems, we would have taken Moscow
in November/December 1941.
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Question : When you encountered heavy Flak, what tactics would
you use in attacking armoured forces?
Answer : We would use Flak elimination forces to keep down
the Flakpanzer and attack the main combat tank force at the
same time.
Question : Could you explain the normal training requirements
for a Schlachtflieger?
Answer : After basic pilot training the selectee would attend
a 3 month course in dive bombing at a dive bomber school.
Then he would attend 3 months of supplementary ( Erganzung)
training with advanced tactics and exercises including train-
ing with other friendly aircraft simulating enemy tactics in
a supplementary squadron. After posting to an operational
unit the new Schlachtflieger would be a wingman (Kettenhund )
for 20 or more combat sorties before being considered opera-
tionally ready, and before being considered for a flight lead
position.
Question : What was the normal crew complement of a Schlacht -
fliegergruppe?
Answer :




50 Bordfunker/Bordschlitzer (Backseaters of the Stuka)
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Question ; In general how would you rate the quality of the
Schlachtflieger? Did you usually receive the "washouts"
from fighter training?
Answer : No! Especially not in the beginning. In order to
withstand the physical demands of flying the Stuka (we had
no "G" suits in those days you know) a pilot would have to
undergo a very detailed special medical examination. A few
pilots like myself constituted an elite force as we had
training in fighters, dive bombers, weather, and advanced
tactics schools. Toward the end of the war, however, we
would receive replacements of personnel who had only had
training in the aircraft that they would fly in combat. As
to the quality of the pilots, they were excellent especially
in the beginning.
Question : Generalmajor Hitschhold has said that the JU87G
could no longer be considered a modern combat aircraft in
1939. Are you of the same opinion?
Answer : No, I wouldn't say so. Look at all of the literature
that has been written about the Stuka. It was an aircraft sui
generis
.
you cannot compare it with anyone else. The only
major defect was that the Stuka was too slow. It was not
adequate for operations against the English in the battle of
England, but it was perfect against Poland, Norway, France,
against sea targets, in the North Africa and Balkans campaigns
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and against Russia. In Russia we did not even require fighter
cover escort --Russian fighter pilots were not a problem for
us. Our training was far superior to theirs, and their tac-
tics and flexibility were inferior. As elite pilots we had
no reservations about engaging Russian fighters with our
Stukas
.
Question : Through your experience with the Russians, how
would you rate them as pilots and soldiers?
Answer : Basically the Russians do not require the luxuries
of Western Armies. The ground troops were quite strong and
could take much punishment. I am not sure if this is a
natural quality or if it was enforced by the commissars, the
source of their toughness is irrelevant; the fact is that
they were tough. They were well disciplined. As far as the
pilots; they were perhaps too rigid in tactics and lower
echelons did not have the authority to exploit all possibili-
ties. Their view points were too narrow and were without
experience throughout the war. I must caution you, however,
the Russians of today are not the same as they were in World
War II. They have learned much from their experiences and
are qualitatively far better than in the last war.
Question : How was your logistics support during the war?
Answer : No problem. With the exception of petrol, we had
everything we needed.
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Question : How did you handle airfield defense without help
from the Army? Did you require additional training in that
area?
Answer : No major problems. The Flak units, which were an
integral part of the Luftwaffe , were positioned at and around
the airfields and were primarily responsible for defense.
However, on occasion we were shelled by ground artillery as
we were positioned close to the front.
Question : Did you encounter major problems in employing
your forces in cold and inclement weather?
Answer : To start with "General Winter" cost us the battle of
Moscow. The cold itself was a problem, but more of a problem
was the suddeness with which winter struck. We could not use
our engine heaters on occasion as they were frozen solid into
ground that had previously been mud. We learned from our
experiences and subsequent winters were not as difficult for
us as the winter of 1941-42 had been, except the situation
of Stalingrad where the Luftwaffe was not able to assure the
needed logistics support because of the rough weather situation.
Question : What were the normal strengths of a Staffel , Gruppe ,
and Geschwader?
Answer :
Unit Aircraft+Res . = Total Commanded by (exceptional)
Staffel 12 +3 = 15 Hauptmann (Oberleutnant)
Gruppe 3 Staffeln+Stab(5)= 50 Oberstleutnant , Major ,
(Haup tmann)
Geschwader 3 Gruppen+Stab (3) =153 Oberst , Oberstleutnant ,
(Major )
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Question : How would you rate the German Luftwaffe today?
Answer : One cannot expect that spirit of national enthusiasm
today, that motivated the Luftwaffe in the years of victories
in World War Two. The spirit of today's Luftwaffe is not
emotional. The pilots of today are realists. They are much
more moderate (in German we call it nuchtern) . They are not
so intensive as we the generation of World War Two were. For
the one it may be a job with all risks, for the other a new
personal engagement. But whatsoever they may feel they will
do their duty and fight for the freedom of the Free World with
the same bravery as we did when we fought for our national
freedom to correct the Treaty of Versailles.
With the tremendous losses and sufferings after the last
war the German people lost themselves in work to build up
again their fatherland. So it seems explainable that they
didn't like to hear anymore of war, of soldiers, of a new
army. Soldiers mean war they said and so they refused the
formation of a new Wehrmacht, the Bundeswehr . In many parts
of the thinking population the opinions seem to have changed
in favor of the Bundeswehr , but there are still lots of people
who consider the Bundeswehr and NATO as necessary evils.
Question : What can NATO do to increase its effectiveness today?
Answer : Make it stronger. More conventional power in addi-
tion to nuclear superiority. First of all military integration
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of all NATO partners without any exceptions and rigorous
standardization of weapons is vital. I deeply regret the
disengagement of the French having left the military inte-
gration of NATO. Opposite the Eastern Threat which is in-
divisible, we need a complete integrated European Army.
Every responsible leader of the Free World is in the position
of having to deal with a sudden conventional attack of the
Warsaw Pact against Western Europe believe it or not. Then
it would be too late for any re-integration of a whole national
army like the French one. For the time being we can hope
that the Chinese threat is still a restraint for the Russians
to keep clear of any adventures towards the West. But how
long? What will happen after Mao? Perhaps appeasement be-
tween the two communists blocks and new friendship! We in
the West do have still an advantage over the Russians in
technology. But one day this may drop as well.
Question : Did you have enough officers in the last war with
general staff training?
Answer : Yes and no. The Fiihrungsstab der Luftwaffe was
interested in 1943 to put Gruppenkommandeure and Geschwader -
kommodore with much combat experience into General Staff
positions of the higher staff levels as there are Division ,
Korps or Luftflotten (which is army level) . This was what
happened to me (and other commanders) as a Geschwaderkommodore
183
in spring 1944 after having absolved an abbreviated General
Staff Course at the Luftkriegs Akademie in Berlin. Only
the fighter commanders tried to escape this trend with success
This is the reason that later in the course of the war we had




Interview Oberst a.D. Hans-Ulrich Rudel
MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD
5 July 1976
Subject : Interview with Oberst a.D. Hans-Ulrich Rudel.
Interview conducted at Chicago, Illinois on 28 June 1976.
Interview conducted in German.
Personal Data : Oberst Rudel entered the armed service at the
Wildpark-Werder Military School in December 1936. He was
commissioned in December 1938 upon completion of Stuka
training. He received further training in Reconnaissance
School. The outbreak of the war with Poland in 1939, he was
in a reconnaissance squadron. Oberst Rudel was later trans-
ferred to Stuka
s
where he subsequently served as a Staffel
,
Gruppe and Geschwader commander. He is Germany's highest
decorated soldier; the only recipient of the Golden Oakleaf
with Swords and Diamonds to the Knight's Cross of the Iron
Cross. He destroyed 519 Russian tanks with the JU87G carry-
ing two 37mm cannons. Oberst Rudel was shot down by Flak
over 30 times during the war and had his right leg amputated
after being severely wounded in 1945. After the war he lived
in Argentina and then returned to Germany. He is currently




Question : In general, how effective was the JU87G with the
two 37mm cannons against enemy tanks?
Answer : Theoretically of course, one could not work too far
behind the front- -usually 10, 20 or 30 kilometers. However,
it was very individual the way in which we operated. In my
case ideally, I had two FW190s to suppress Flak while I
would attack the enemy tanks with the JU87G. However, often
we did not have the Flak suppression aircraft and we worked
with what was available. Effectiveness was also an individual
matter, for example, I was the top "Tank Killer" with 519
total kills. The next three pilots had 100, 70, and 60,
respectively.
Question : What specific tactics would you use in attacking
tanks?
Answer : You must understand that the JU87G was a very diffi-
cult aircraft to fly and we lost many pilots while they were
attacking tanks, as they simply did not have the experience
to employ the JU87G most effectively and survive. My basic
tactic would be an attack altitude of about 800 meters and
an attack speed of 320-340 kilometers per hour, with a dive
angle of about twenty degrees and a firing slant range of
100 to 200 meters. However, the above figures are only rough
ones. What I would do would be to roll in for an attack, then
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jink very severely to avoid Flak and the last moment roll
out and fire. If I missed the tank I would adjust the aim
point for the next pass. My sight picture was obtained by a
"seat of the pants" feeling that I acquired by experience.
We lost most of our anti-tank pilots to Flak when they would
make a long pass for aiming at the tank and naturally flying
a straight flight path. The gunners on the ground would shoot
us down during this critical phase of flight. Only the most
experienced pilots could fly the JU87G. Each 37mm cannon
weighed 420 kilograms , the landing speed was 180 kilometers
per hour versus the normal Stuka with 140 kilometers per hour.
Additionally one could not pull as many "G's" and the aircraft
was not aerodynamical ly sound. We had no aircraft that could
be used in mass with relatively inexperienced pilots. It
was a very individual matter how one would attack a tank.
We had many losses at first especially during the tracking
phase of attack.
Question : Did you encounter any significant problems in
coordinating air operations with the Army?
Answer : No, coordination through radio with ground troops
worked quite satisfactorily. We also used a Luftwaffe offi-
cer, who was detailed to the Army. He would always be co-
located with the ground personnel at the very front lines and
would act as a liaison man as well as coordinating actual air
strikes.
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Question : Did you have any serious logistics problems?
Answer : No, in principle we had everything we needed. Sel-
dom did we lack for munitions. Fuel was a problem, especially
later in the war, but that was a production problem, not a
logistics one.
Question : Was weather a problem?
Answer : Yes! The suddeness with which severe weather would
come was a shock. Aircraft maintenance had to be increased,
for example a normal Stuka engine life before overhaul was
100 to 150 hours, in the severe cold of the Russian winter
the engines would last only 40 to 45 hours.
We naturally had to preheat our aircraft engines -- it was
so difficult on occasions we developed the policy of "it
will either start up or burn up." The cold of 40 to 50
degrees under zero centigrade even caused the hydraulic fluid
and lubricants to freeze. On occasion our ground personnel
would stay up all night and start the aircraft engines at
half hour intervals so as to have them ready for the first
sorties in the morning.
As for personnel we lived about 507o of the time in bunkers
and 507o in native huts. The native housing was however
usually lice infested. We had to de-lice these quarters be-
fore they could be used. The poorer class of Russians were
very primitive.
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Question : Did you have any special measures for airfield
defense?
Answer : No. Defense was the responsibility of the host
company. The Luftwaffe had its own Flak troops who usually
had no problem in handling airfield defense. On occasion we
would augment these forces in the case of a Russian attack,
but this was not the norm.
Question : To what do you attribute the success of the Luftwaffe
in the last war, especially considering the inferiority of your
numbers?
Answer : The Wehrmacht owed its successes to many factors.
We had a tremendous will and dedication. Local commanders
had the authority to conduct operations as they saw fit.
Individual units were given assignments and how they carried
it out was generally their business. Our personnel were
highly trained and our equipment generally superior.
Question : Can you explain the characteristics of Russian
soldiers in the last war? What were their good points? What
were their bad points?
Answer : Of the pilots, 5% were good, the so-called Stalin -
geschwader . The other 957o were average. They were very
brave but did not show much flexibility. The ground troops
were very numerous, brave and did not require much support.
In spite of their good points, the Russians would have never
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gotten to Germany without American help. While we in Germany-
had many fine weapons, especially the Panther and Tiger tanks,
we lost all of our good people. We could not replace the core
of experience that we lost with our elite personnel.
Question : What do you consider the strong and weak points of
NATO today and how can it be improved?
Answer : If you want to make NATO stronger, make it like the
Wehrmacht was in 1940. If the Russians attack today, it will
take them 2 days to get to the English Channel. Today the
Bundeswehr is not 1/1000 what the Wehrmacht was. The U.S.
is preoccupied with domestic problems of Race, unemployment
and your economy. Can the U S concentrate on Europe? I
don't have much faith in NATO.
Question : Did you consider physical conditioning of your
pilots an important factor in success?
Answer : Most emphatically yes! On one occasion I flew 17
sorties in one day and days of a dozen sorties per man were
not uncommon. During periods of intense activity, the first
sorties would launch at 0300 hours and the last launch at
2200 hours. We would rest underneath our aircraft between
flights. I would personally take a 10 km run every day.
We organized sports events within the unit on a daily basis.
190
APPENDIX XII








































3450 17.2 4.17 6 Mil







4" Mil „„,, .
Not included in study matrix
M50/Improved _ F-5E Gun
due to low muzzle energy















20 Gatling 3 4000 73 130 0.53 Linkless 3700 39.5 4.79 G.E. Proposal
Improved Gat ling 25 Gatling 6 4200 90.5 298 1.11 Linkless 3600 79.9 10.17 G.E. Proposal
PFB-25 25 Recip. 1 600 113.7 247 1.30 Linked 3612 80.4 1.46 7700 5000 1 Mil
Added to study matrix due to high muzzle energy.




25 Gatling 3 3000 92 160 1.11 Linkless 3600 79.9 7.26 G.E. Proposal
Mauser
MK-27 27 Revolver 1 1700 91 216 1.27 Linked 3440 104.9 5.40
Not a NATO standard cartridge. Included in study matrix
prior to NATO standardization. Ref. Only MRCA Gun







Out of production since 1971.
HEI/SAPI „ c -_, - Harrier Gun
' Reference Only







3 Mil A-A/A-G —Mirage, laguar Gun
XM-188 DEFA 30 Gatling 3 2000 59 200 1.12 Linked Proposed for Advanced Attack Helicopter (AAH)





8000 HEI/API — A- 10 Gun
GAU-9 30 Revolver 1 1350 106 286 2.18 Linked 3382 141.0 5.77 11,000 2 Mil — Viggen Gun
Mauser
Model F 30 Recip 1 800 126.3 435 2.18 Linked 3300







30 Gatling 3 2000 113 265 1.50 Linkless









1. Baumbach, Oberst a.D. Werner, The Life and Death of the
Luftwaffe
. New York: Coward-McCann, Inc., 1949.
2. Bekker, Cajus, The Luftwaffe War Diaries . New York:
Doubleday and Company, 1964.
3. Caidin, Martin, The Tigers Are Burning . New York:
Hawthorn Books, Inc., 1974.
4. Carell, Paul (pseudonym) , Unterhehmen Barbarossa
.
Frankfurt: Ullstein GmbH, 1963.
5. , Scorched Earth. The Russian-German War .
1943-44, Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1970.
6. Craig, Gordon A., The Politics of the Prussian Army
.
1640-1945, New York: Oxford University Press, 1956.
7. De Blij , Harm J., Systematic Political Geography . New
York: John Wiley and Sons, Inc., 1967.
8. Enrico, Po, Tanks of the Great Armies . Genoa: Interconair
S.A., 1969.
9. Fest, Joachim C, Hitler . New York: Harcourt Brace
Jovanovich, Inc., 1973.
10. Galland, Generalleutnant a.D. Adlof. Ries , K. & Ahnert, R.
,
The Luftwaffe at War . 1939-1945, London: Ian Allen,
1972.
11. Green, William, The Warplanes of the Third Reich . New
York: Doubleday and Company, Inc., 1970.
12. Guderian, Generaloberst a.D. Heinz, Panzer Leader .
New York: E.P. Dutton and Company, Inc., 1952.
13. Hart, Captain Sir Basil Henry Liddell, The German






History of the Second World War . New York:
G.P. Putnam's Sons, 1970.
15.
,
Strategy, New York: Praeger, 1967.
16. Hoffschmidt, E.J. and Tan turn, W.H. IV, Tank Data II
.
Old Greenwich: We Inc., 1969.
17. Hunter, Holland, Soviet Transport Experience. Its
Lessons for Other Countries . Washington, D.C.: The
Brookings Institution, 1968.
18. Irving, David. Die Tragodie der Deutschen Luftwaffe
.
Frankfurt: Verlag Ullstein GmbH, 1970.
19. Jane's All The World's Aircraft
, (edited by John W. R.
Taylor) London: Jane's Yearbooks, 1975.
20. Just, Giinther, Stuka-Oberst Hans-Ulrich Rudel , Stuttgart
Motor Buck Verlag, 1975.
21. Keitel, Generalfeldmarschall Wilhelm, The Memoirs of
Field-Marshal Keitel
.
(edited by Walter Gorlitz)
New York: Stein and Day, 1966.
22. Lawrence, Richard D. and Record, Jeffrey, U.S. Force
Structure in NATO. An Alternative
.
Washington, D. C.:
The Brookings Institution, 1974.
23. Lydolph, Paul E. , Geography of the USSR . New York:
John Wiley and Sons, Inc., 1970.
24. Macksey, Kenneth and Batchelor, John H. , Tank. A
History of the Armoured Fighting Vehicle . New York:
Ballantine Books, 1971.
25. Macksey, Kenneth, Guderian. Creator of the Blitzkrieg .
New York: Stein and Day, 1975.
26. Mahlke, Generalleutnant a.D. Helmut, Nahkampfflieger
Verbande . Celle-Westercelle: Schweiger und Pick
Verlag, 1971.
27. Manstein, Generalfeldmarschall a.D. Erich von, Lost
Victories , Chicago: Henry Regnery Company, 1958.
193
28. Mason, Herbert Molloy, Jr., The Rise of the Luftwaffe
.
New York: Ballantine Books, 1973.
29. Mellenthin, Generalmaj or a.D. F.W. von, Panzer Battles
.
Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1956.
30. Milsom, John, Russian Tanks 1900-70 . Harrisburg:
Stackpole Books, 1970.
31. Osterkamp, General der Flieger a.D. Theo, Durch Hohen




32. Oxford Regional Economic Atlas, The USSR and Eastern
Europe , London: Oxford University Press, 1959.
33. Price, Alfred, Bildbuch der Deutschen Luftwaffe 1933-
1945 , Hamburg: Verlag Gerhard Stalling AG, 1969.
34. Philippi, Alfred and Heim, Ferdinand, Der Feldzug gegen
Sowjetrussland 1941-1945 , Stuttgard: Kohlhammer GmbH.
,
1962.
35. Rommel, Generalfeldmarschall Erwin, The Rommel Papers
.
(edited by B. H. Liddell Hart) New York: Harcourt,
Brace and Company, 1953.
36. Rudel, Oberst a.D. Hans-Ulrich. Stuka Pilot . Dublin:
Washburn and Sons, Ltd., 1952.
37. Senger und Etterlin, Oberst a.D. F.M. von, Kampfpanzer
1916-66
. Miinchen: J.F. Lehmanns Verlag, 1971.
38. Shtemenko, S.M., The Soviet General Staff at War 1941 -
1945 . Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1970.
39. Smith, Peter C., Stuka at War , New York: Arco Publish-
ing Company, Inc., 1971.
40. Speer, Albert, Inside the Third Reich , New York:
MacMillan Company, 1970.
41. Statesman's Year-Book, Statistical and Historical Annual
of the States of the World for the Year 1975-1976 .
(edited by John Paxton) , New York: Saint Martin's
Press, 1975.
194
42. Taylor, John W.R. , Combat Aircraft of the World . New
York: MacMillan Company, 1970.
43. Tippelskirch, General der Infanterie a.D. Kurt von,
Geschichte des Zweiten Weltkrieges
. Bonn: Athenaum-
Verlag, 1959.
44. Warliamont, General der Infanterie a.D. Walter, Inside
Hitler's Headquarters 1939-45 , New York: Praeger,
1962.
45. Weeks, Colonel (retired) John, Men Against Tanks , A
History of Anti-Tank Warfare , New York: Mason/Charter,
1975.
46. White Paper 1975/1976. The Security of the Federal
Republic of Germany and the Development of the Federal
Armed Forces , Bonn: Federal Ministry of Defense, 1975.
47. Wolfe, Thomas W. , Soviet Power and Europe , 1945, 1970,
Baltimore: The John Hopkins Press, 1970.
195
Letters :
1. Headquarters USAF Systems Command, Andrews AFB, MD.,
Confidential Letter to ASD/YXM, Wright-Patterson AFB,
OH., Subject: A-10A/GAU-8A Effectiveness
. 15 Apr 1975.
2. General Electric Company, Armament Systems Department,
unclassified Letter to Capt. Ratley, Subject: GE
30mm GAU-8 Pod Version . 27 September 1976.
3. General Electric Company, Armament Systems Department,
unclassified Letter to Capt. Ratley, Subject: GE
30mm GAU-8 Pod Version , 1 August 1976.
4. Oberst a.D. Hans-Ulrich Rudel, Kufstein, Austria,
unclassified Letter to Admiral Isham Linder, Subject:
37mm JU87G Cannon , 29 July 1976.
5. Brigadegeneral a.D. Paul-Werner Hozzel, Karlsruhe, West
Germany, unclassified Letter to Capt. Ratley, Subject:
JU87 Stuka , 31 July 1976.
6. Dr. Horst Boog, Freiburg im Breisgau, West Germany,
unclassified Letter to Capt. Ratley, Subject: Stuka
Pilots , 14 May 1976.
7. Herr Noack, Freiburg im Breisgau, West Germany,
unclassified Letter to Capt. Ratley, Subject: Schlacht -
flieger , 31 May 1976.
8. Air University Maxwell AFB, Al., unclassified Letter to
TAC Langley AFB, Va./DR, Subject: Research of WW II
Tactical Air Operations in Europe , 17 December 1975.
196
Pamphlets :
1. Bateson, Richard P., Profile 211-Junkers JU87D
.
Berkshire: Profile Publications Ltd., (no date).
2. Feist, Uwe and Dario, Mike, Luftwaffe in Action Part III
,
Warren: Squadron/Signal Publications, 1972.
3. General Dynamics, F-16 Air Combat Fighter , General
Dynamics, 1 September 1975.
4. General Electric, Gun Weapons Systems , General Electric,
1975.
5. Fairchild Republic, A-10 , Fairchild Industries, 1975.
6. Identification Guide (Ordnance Equipment) Warsaw Pact
Countries , USA Europe and Seventh Army, USAREUR Pam
30-60-1, July 1968.
Films :
1. SPR 31-76, A-10 Lethality/Combat Ammo Demonstration ,
USAF Aerospace Audio-Visual Service, (MAC), 1976.
197
Special Studies and Research Papers :
1. Stolfi, Professor, R.H.S., Chance in History, The
Russian Winter of 1941-42 , Naval Postgraduate School,
Monterey, 1975.
2. The German Air Force Monngraph Project . From the Karlsruhe
Collection, Located at the Air University Library,
Maxwell AFB, Alabama.
Numbered Studies :
a. Plocher, Generalleutnant a.D. Hermann, #153 The








#155 The German Air Force Versus
Russia, 1943 .
d. Deichmann, General der Flieger a.D. Paul, #160
German Air Force Operations in Support of
the Army .
e. Nielsen, Generalleutnant a.D. Andreas. #173 The
German Air Force General Staff .
f. Uebe, Generalleutnant a.D. , Klaus, #174 Command
and Leadership in the German Air Force .
g. , #176 Russian Reactions to German
Airpower in World War II .
h. Suchenwirth, Dr. Richard, #189 Historical Turning
Points in the German Air Force War Effort.
198
Periodicals :
1. Branby, Lieutenant Colonel Harlan E. , USAF, "A-10, Tank
Killer," USAF Fighter Weapons Review , Winter 75, p. 1-
7, December 1975.
2. "Fairchild Republic, A-10: New Thunder for the USAF,"
Air Combat , Volume 4, Number 3, p. 22-40, May 1976.
3. "Fat^iXa^-iTj," Flight International , 24 January 1976.
4. Karber, Phillip A., "The Soviet Anti-Tank Debate,"
Survival , Volume XVIII, Number 3, p. 105-110, May/
June 1976.
f ' ****
5. Meller, R. , "Europe's New Generation of Combat Aircraft
Part 1, The Increasing Threat," International Defense
Review , Volume 8, p. 175-186, April 1975.
6. Powell, Colonel Craig, USAF, retired, "The A-10," Army ,
March 1976.
7. "USAF Tests A-10 Gun System Lethality," Aviation Week
and Space Technology , Volume 104, Number 1, p. 15,
5 January 1976.
8. "USAF Plans A-10 Deployment to Europe/W^viation Week





1. LTV Aerospace, Inc., Vought Aeronautics Company, Report
Number 2-55300/2R-8619, A-7D 30mm Gun Demonstration
Prototype , 14 February 1972, Unclassified.
2. m^JSMmAmm^^s^mymmimm^^ii^m^hi ^oponautioo Company, RcpB Ufc
HUlllUUl 2 ' 14000/3Il 7, A 7D/A 10 iHliieiuii and Vultiow -
^al^^^Li*mtesbB*A&i6Alm*&m&*—25—Avmm 1Q73i
3. iUBlmAmmm&pam+rmim**i Vought AoigowaufeLco G empemy, ftepwrt
Mniwbiw 1 5fi1fitl/an ftBfljMS The flana fli» BgEggg* Mioo&in
Q-r\/-\vo ,f- t oaa.0 J Jtea&imBam0Sk£A^JLLm£em*mab***M2Am
5. LTV Aerospace, Inc., Vought Aeronautics Company, Report
Number 2-14000/4R-10 , A-7D Navigation/Weapon Delivery
System, Capabilities and Tactical Options . 11 March
1974, Unclassified.
6. LTV Aoroopaoot Ino i Unnrrhr gnni
i





Mwmboif^a 55300/an 0636, A 7D Gun IiumlluLlULl . Q iluy
i.ii, iw— 1
1
LTV Ac uei space, Iwe i
,
Veug,hfe AaL'ewaufeLee^gtiipawyy^eywpt
ftlwrna oM 3 5ftaU/3ft 8 6 Q3i Tho Eui>o p o ftw C embaL GLiuuuiu
A Ba ehnMouiid foi? A 7D/A 10 Gf\yfilBiil ii t\ \i '&mAm&*&±**m*imm+
a a r e ii uuQL»«M lij^S^MWMBBBT"
United States General Accounting Office, Staff Study, A-10
Close Air Support Aircraft . March 1974, Unclassified.
United States Strategic Institute, Report Number 76-2,
Soviet Warsaw Pact Forces . Erickson, John, P. 41,
February 1976, Unclassified.
Defense Intelligence Agency, Report Number DDI 1120-129-76,
Soviet Tank Company Tactics . May 1976, Unclassified.
200
11. SiiTf^trnm Plnnning Corporation. Rap s gfe Numbag 35Qp Volut. e f
Hnrhmnn fa | 00 Juiil 1QT C
12. t^-p P u n_ r /^„ MABQ^ ttapirt Mwtbow AP /'1/' Q
201
Unpublished Documents and Papers :
Bundesarchiv -Mil i ^•a^^-a^j^ar<|^>^Q -;K1 1 ^»r> j^ Breisgau, West Germany




















Air University Library , Maxwell AFB, Alabama
Karlsruhe Document Collection :
K 113.3019-4 1937-1945 thru K 113.3019-6 1906-1945
K 113.3019-7 1936-1945 thru K 113.3019-11 1934-1945




1. Defense Documentation Center 2
Cameron Station
Alexandria, VA. 22314
2. Library, Code 0212 2
Naval Postgraduate School
Monterey, CA. 93940
3. Department Chairman 2




4. Professor R.H.S. Stolfi 15




5. CAPT L. 0. Ratley III, USAF 10
582F Michelson
Monterey, CA. 93940
6. MAJ Charles Earnhart 2
AFIT/CIP
Wright-Patterson AFB, OH. 45433
7. COL James C. Keenan 1
AFIS/INH
Ft. Belvoir, VA. 22060
8. BRIG GEN William D. Curry 1
355 TFW/CC
Davis Monthan AFB, AZ . 85707





10. COL Robert Dilger
ASD/YXA
Wright-Patterson AFB, OH. 45433
11. COL W. S. Harpe
AFMPC/DPMY
Randolph AFB, TX. 78148
12. BRIG GEN James R. Hildreth
ACWAL/AIMVAL JTDD
Nellis AFB, NV. 89191
13. COL J. McFadden
354 TFW/DCM
Myrtle Beach AFB, SC. 29577
14. Mr. C. E. Meyers
Department of Defense




15. BRIG GEN T. H. McMullen
TAC/DR
Langley, AFB, VA. 23665
16. Mr. Fred Feer
CIA/HQ
Washington, D. C. 20505
17. General Elwood Quesada (Retd.)
L' Enfant Plaza
Washington, D. C. 20024
18. Mr. P. M. Sprey
Box 264, R.D. 1
Glenn Dale, MD. 20769
19. Mr. Thomas Turner
Fairchild Industries
Germantown, MD. 20767
20. Industrial College of the Armed Forces
Library
Ft. Lesley J. McNair
Washington, D. C. 20319
204





22. MAJ G. H. Felix, USAF
Marine Corps Command & Staff College
Quantico, VA. 22134
23. USMC Development & Education Cmd
Quantico, VA. 22134
24. USAF TAWC
Eglin AFB, FL. 32542
25. HQ USMC
Deputy Chief of Staff Plans & Policies
LT GEN L. Snowden
Arlington, VA. 22212
26. USAF Air University Library
Maxwell AFB, AL. 36112
27. CMDR, Naval Weapons Center






Aberdeen Proving Grounds, MD. 21005





Langley AFB, VA. 23665
31. 354 TFW/DO
Myrtle Beach AFB, SC. 29577
32. 23 TFW/DO
England AFB, LA. 71301
205
33. USAC 4SC
Ft. Leavenworth, Kansas 66027
34. 355 TFW/DOW
Davis Monthan AFB, AZ
. 85707
35. 355 TFW/DO(A-7)
Davis Monthan AFB, AZ . 85707
36. 355 TFW/DO(A-10)
Davis Monthan AFB, AZ . 85707
37. 333 TFTS/CC
Davis Monthan AFB, AZ . 85707
38. 333 TFTS/DO
Davis Monthan AFB, AZ . 85707
39. 333 TFTS/WPNS (CAPT Haar)
Davis Monthan AFB, AZ . 85707
40. AFTEC A-10 Test Force/CC
Davis Monthan AFB, AZ . 85707
41. OLAC 4444 OPS SQ (ISD)
Davis Monthan AFB, AZ . 85707
42. 355 TTS/CC
Davis Monthan AFB, AZ . 85707
43. Mr. Bob Forker
Hughes Helicopters
Ordnance Division
Culver City, CA. 90230
44. Herrn Dr. Granier
Bundesarchiv-Militararchiv
78 Freiburg im Breisgau
Wiesentr 10
West Germany
45. Herrn Dr. Horst Boog
Wiss Oberrat
Militargeschichtliches Forschungsamt
7800 Freiburg im Breisgau
West Germany
206
46. LT COL Robert G. Appelbaugh
USAF TAWC/TEFE
Eglin AFB, FL. 32542
47. Albert F. Simpson
Historical Research Center
Maxwell AFB, AL. 36112
48. CMDR Naval Air Systems Command
ATTN: PMA 235 B





Washington, D. C. 20301
50. LT COL Howard J. Pierson
180 Magnolia
Shaw AFB, SC . 29152
51. USAF





Washington, D. C. 20301
52. USAF





Washington, D. C. 20301
53. USAF
DCS /Research & Development





Washington, D. C. 20301
207
54. HQ TAC/DO AT
Langley AFB, VA. 23665
55. HQ TAC/DO
Langley AFB, VA. 23665
56. HQ TAC/DOOO
Langley AFB, VA. 23665
57. HQ TAC/DOOF
Langley AFB, VA. 23665
58. HQ TAC/XP
Langley AFB, VA. 23665
59. USAF Academy
Library
USAF Academy, Colo. 80840
60. USAF TFWC/TA
Nellis AFB, NV. 89191
61. 57 FWW/DO
Nellis AFB, NV. 89191
62. 12 AF/DO
Bergstrom AFB, TX. 78743
63. 9 AF/DO





















TV cl A comparison of the
£ USAF projected A-10
c employment in Europe
and the Luftwaffe
Schlachtqeschwader ex-
perience on the eastern
front in V/orld War Two.
16
"» o »» n 7











perience on the eastern
front in World War Two.
thesR2435
A comparison of the USAF projected A- 10
3 2768 002 05302 7
DUDLEY KNOX LIBRARY
